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ABSTRACT

Chen, Jing. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2015. Selection Versus Rejection: The
Role of Task Framing in Decision Making. Major Professor: Robert W. Proctor.

Procedure invariance is a basic assumption of rational theories of choice, however, it
has been shown to be violated: Different response modes, or task frames, sometimes
reveal opposite preferences. This study focused on selection and rejection task frames,
involving a unique type of problem with enriched and impoverished options, which has
led to conflicting findings and theoretical explanations. On the one hand, greater
preference has been found for the enriched option in the selection task than in the
rejection task; this result is explained by a compatibility account, in which the positive
features of the enriched option are more compatible with the selection task and the
negative features with the rejection task (Shafir, 1993). On the other hand, it has been
found that this preference difference in the two tasks interacts with the relative
attractiveness of the two options: The enriched option is preferred more (less) often in
the selection task than in the rejection task when it is more (less) attractiveness than the
impoverished option; this finding is attributed to the accentuation of difference
between options in the selection task, as stated in the accentuation account (Wedell,
1997).

xi
My dissertation focused on examining the role of task frame in human decision
making by distinguishing the compatibility and accentuation accounts, using an
information-processing approach. Experiment 1 was conducted online on introductory
psychology class students, with a plain statement for the task (either a selection or a
rejection task). A large difference between the two task frames (i.e., the task framing
effect) was found as predicted by the accentuation account. In Experiment 2,
participants were recruited from the same subject pool but were required to verbalize
their thoughts while performing the same tasks in a laboratory. No difference between
the two task frames in the choice data was found in this experiment, possibly due to the
need for verbalization of reasons in Experiment 2 or participants’ confusion about the
rejection task in Experiment 1. With a modified version of the questionnaire conducted
on both MTurk workers (Experiment 3A) and introductory psychology students
(Experiment 3B), Experiment 3 emphasized the tasks in several different ways to
reduce the possible confusion regarding the task, and a similar pattern as in Experiment
1 was evident though with a smaller effect size. Thus, it was established that task
confusion cannot explain the task framing effect alone.
Experiment 4 used a judgment task, in which participants were required to rate
the likelihood of selecting or rejecting an option. It was again found that more
participants in the negative task did not understand the task correctly before any
feedback was provided. The ratings from this experiment were used as direct
attractiveness measures, and a similar task framing effect was found with these
measures. The finding of task framing effect was supported by the data from an eyetracking experiment (Experiment 5), in which participants performed the tasks in the

xii
lab without being required to verbalize their thoughts. In the last two experiments,
whether the task framing effect was influenced by time pressure was tested.
Experiment 6 imposed time limits on participants and required them to respond within
a short time, whereas Experiment 7 forced participants to wait a certain amount of time
before they could respond. Both experiments found a task framing effect that did not
differ from that in Experiment 3A, which indicates that this task framing effect was
relatively automatic and that it did not take extra time for people to be more
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task.
The current results are not consistent with the compatibility account, which
predicts the enriched option always to be preferred more in the selection task. Instead,
they are more consistent with the accentuation account, which predicts that the
difference between the two task frames would interact with the relative attractiveness
of the two options, with people being more discriminating under the selection task
frame. Based on the current findings, a modified version of the accentuation account,
explaining the difference between the two task frames in terms of availability of
cognitive resources, was proposed. The modified accentuation account suggests that
people are less discriminating in the rejection task because understanding the task per
se is more effortful and occupies more cognitive resources.

1

INTRODUCTION
The principle of invariance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Tversky, Sattath, &
Slovic, 1988), which includes description invariance and procedure invariance (Shafir
& Tversky, 1995; Slovic, 1995), is a basic assumption of rational theories of choice.
Description and procedure invariance refer to the proposition that people’s preferences
should be consistent across different presentations of the options and methods of
elicitation, respectively. These sub-principles of invariance have been shown to be
violated in human decision making, the former in terms of information presentation
and the latter in terms of response mode. For instance, the well-known framing effect
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1986) violates description invariance, in which people’s
preferences are influenced by whether the same problem is presented in a positive or
negative frame. The current study focused on violation of procedure invariance, in
which different elicitation methods, or response modes, lead to predictably inconsistent
preferences.
Preference Reversal
One robust phenomenon that violates procedure invariance is preference
reversal. For example, when faced with two bets, one with large payoff but low
probability (i.e., the $ bet) and the other with small payoff but high probability (i.e., the
P bet), participants chose the P bet more often in a choice task but bid a higher price for

2
the $ bet in a pricing task (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971, 1973; see also Slovic, 1995).
Preference reversal has also been found between attractiveness rating and pricing tasks,
with the P bet given higher rating in attractiveness but $ bet stated a higher price (e.g.,
Rubaltelli, Dickert, & Slovic, 2012; Schkade & Johnson, 1989). These distinct tasks
involve different information-processing patterns and decision strategies.
Preference reversal has been established for other problems besides the gambles.
Tversky et al. (1988) found that participants showed inconsistent preferences when
performing choice versus matching tasks. In one of their problems, participants were to
choose between two candidates for a position of production engineer. The scores on
technical knowledge and human relations were provided for both candidates.
Participants were told that the technical-knowledge attribute was more important than
the human-relations attribute. One group of participants was given the two scores of
each candidate and was to make a choice between the two candidates (i.e., the choice
task); the other group was given three of the total four scores and was to generate the
missing score to match the two candidates for the job (i.e., the matching task). In the
choice task, the chosen candidate was the preferred one; in the matching task, a
generated score lower than the missing value implied a preference for the candidate
with the missing value. Tversky et al. found that in the choice task 65% of the
participants indicated preference for the candidate with a higher score on technical
knowledge, whereas in the matching task only 34% did so. This choice-matching
discrepancy (also known as the prominence effect) suggests that the more important
attribute looms larger in choice than in matching, and that the weightings of the
attributes depend on the response mode. Tversky et al. proposed a

3
contingent-weighting model to explain this finding, in which the trade-offs among
attributes are contingent on the nature of the response, and “the weighting of inputs is
enhanced by their compatibility with the output” (p. 371).
The Compatibility Principle
The compatibility effect is well known in the human performance literature:
Performance is better when the stimulus is compatible with the response than when it is
not (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Proctor & Reeve, 1990). For example,
when responding to the location of a circle presented on a monitor, responses in the
same relative location as the stimuli (e.g., a left keypress to a left circle) are faster and
more accurate than those in the opposite relative location. This finding is called spatial
stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) effect, which has been investigated widely
(e.g., Fitts & Deininger, 1954; Proctor & Vu, 2006). More generally, Kornblum et al.
(1990) proposed the idea of dimensional overlap for the SRC effect, which is defined
as the degree to which attributes in stimuli and responses are “perceptually,
structurally, or conceptually” similar. For example, a stimulus set of left and right
locations has dimensional overlap (or similarity) with a response set of left and right
keypresses, as well as a stimulus set of “left” and “right” words with that response set.
Starting from Tversky et al. (1988), the concept of compatibility has been
brought into the field of human decision making. A similar effect of compatibility
between stimulus attributes and response mode, or task nature, has also been studied in
human decision making, though not as extensively as in the field of human
performance. Similar to the dimensional overlap model (Kornblum et al., 1990),
Slovic, Griffin, and Tversky (1990) concluded that the features that could enhance the

4
compatibility between stimuli and responses include “the use of the same units (e.g.,
grades, ranks), the direction of relations (e.g., whether the correlations between input
and output variables are positive or negative), and the numerical correspondence (e.g.,
similarity) between the values of input and output variables” (p. 23). The rationale for
the compatibility effect is that the characteristics of the output tend to put more weights
on the most compatible features of the input, and incompatibility requires additional
efforts in mental transformation. Thus, the influence of response modes on the decision
maker’s preference is explained in terms of their compatibility with stimulus attributes.
Slovic et al. (1990) tested the compatibility effect with several experiments. In
one experiment, participants were provided with both market value (in billions of
dollars) and rank in market value of companies in a previous year, and were to predict
each company’s market value or rank in the next year. Consistent with the
compatibility principle, participants who were required to predict market value
weighted market value more than rank, and those who were to predict the rank
weighted rank more than market value. In another experiment of Slovic et al.,
participants were asked to predict some students’ performance in a history course,
based on those students’ letter grade and class rank in two other courses, respectively.
For participants who made the prediction in terms of letter grade, the course presented
in letter grade was weighted more than that in class rank, and the opposite was true for
participants who made the prediction in terms of class rank.
The compatibility principle also explains preference reversals in experimental
settings such as in comparison versus evaluation tasks and corresponding features
(Dhar & Nowlis, 2004; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997). Nowlis and Simonson proposed
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that people’s preferences are affected by whether the task is to compare between the
alternatives or to evaluate the alternatives individually. Specifically, “comparable”
attributes such as price are more compatible with comparison tasks (e.g., choice),
whereas “enriched” attributes such as brand name are more compatible with separate
evaluation tasks (e.g., purchase likelihood rating), because the comparable attributes
are easier to compare than the enriched attributes. In an example, there were two
alternative televisions, TV A with lower price and low-quality brand ($209,
Magnavox) and B with higher price and high-quality brand ($309, Sony). Participants
were to choose between two televisions in a choice task and to rate their likelihood of
purchase for each product in a rating task. Nowlis and Simonson found that TV A was
preferred more often in the choice task than in the purchase likelihood rating task,
whereas TV B was preferred more often in the rating than in the choice task.
In Nowlis and Simonson’s (1997) study, similar preference reversals were also
found with manipulations preserving the compatibility relation but the reversals
disappeared when the compatibility relation was removed. The preference reversals
were found for a low-quality brand product with an additional feature versus a highquality brand product without that additional feature, and for a lower-price product
with inferior country of origin versus a high-price product with superior country of
origin, with the former alternatives in each pair being preferred more in choice than in
ratings. The preference reversals also generalized to other types of comparison-based
task (e.g., strength of preference ratings) and separate evaluation task (e.g., whether to
purchase), and were eliminated when prices in dollars were replaced with price
descriptions (e.g., “very high price”), or when brand names were replaced with numeric
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quality ratings. These results support the principle of compatibility that the weighting
of an attribute is influenced by its compatibility with the preference elicitation task:
Attributes that produce easy and clear comparisons are more compatible with
comparison-based tasks, and less comparable attributes are more compatible with
separate evaluation tasks.
Selection Versus Rejection Tasks
As reviewed above, besides the tasks of choice, pricing, rating, and matching
(e.g., Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Tversky et al., 1988), decision tasks have also been
shown to influence decision-makers’ preferences in terms of letter grade versus of class
ranks (Slovic et al., 1990), and comparing alternatives versus evaluating alternatives
individually (Dhar & Nowlis, 2004; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997). Among these tasks,
one unique pair is selection versus rejection tasks, which are both choice tasks and are
intuitively complementary (e.g., Lai & Hui, 2006; Meloy & Russo, 2004). People can
choose from two options by selecting one (and implicitly eliminate the other) or
rejecting one (and implicitly retain the other). However, studies have shown that these
two tasks could reveal opposite preferences when the same alternatives are given.
The Compatibility Account
Selection and rejection tasks have been shown to be influential especially on
problems involving attribute valence (e.g., good vs. bad). This influence has been
explained in terms of the principle of compatibility (e.g., Shafir, 1993). The idea is that
features are weighted more in a task that is compatible with them: Good features of an
option have greater influence in a selection than in a rejection task, whereas bad
features are more important in a rejection than in a selection task. The unevenly
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weighted features in decision process lead to different preferences under these tasks
even with the same presentation of the options.
Nagpal and Krishnamurthy (2008) used the compatibility account to explain the
difficulty in making a decision between two unattractive alternatives compared to that
between two attractive alternatives. They proposed that the incompatibility between
the unattractiveness and the selection task leads to greater decision difficulty and
longer decision time. The compatibility is between the attribute valence and the nature
of the task, that attractive alternatives are more compatible with a selection task (i.e., “I
will choose option: A/B”), and unattractive alternatives are more compatible with a
rejection task (i.e., “I will reject option: A/B”). The selection task requires a relative
attractiveness judgment, which is incompatible with unattractiveness and leads to
difficulty in decision making. To resolve this incompatibility, the authors used tasks of
selecting as well as rejecting one of two options. Decision time, difficulty, effort, and
motivation were examined as a function of compatibility. In the selection task,
decisions were faster, easier, less effortful, and required less processing motivation for
attractive than for unattractive alternatives, and the reverse was found in the rejection
task.
In addition, Nagpal and Krishnamurthy’s (2008) Experiment 2 framed the same
option attributes positively (e.g., “The tint successfully blocks 80% of harmful rays
from the sun”) or negatively (e.g., “The tint fails to block 20% of harmful rays from the
sun”), to make them attractive or unattractive, respectively. Similar results were found
with this manipulation. Although Nagpal and Krishnamurthy’s study did not focus on
the choice per se, in a later study Krishnamurthy and Nagpal (2010) found the
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influence of incompatibility on decision makers’ choices when options are presented
sequentially. The assumption was that incompatibility resulted in effortful processing,
which causes overweighting of the attributes. Thus, incompatibility induced preference
for the option when the attributes were positive in a rejection task, and against the
option when the attributes were negative in a selection task.
Compatibility can also be elicited by manipulating participants’ goal orientation
and the nature of the decision task. Chernev (2009) generated a promotion-focus (or
prevention-focus) goal orientation by instructing participants to write an essay about
hopes / aspirations (or duties / obligations). One difference between the promotion and
prevention foci is that the former involves a concern with positive outcomes and the
latter with negative outcomes. Thus, promotion focus is more compatible with the
selection task and prevention focus is more compatible with the rejection task.
Participants were to select or give up one of two options, or to decide by tossing a coin.
The measurement used was decision confidence, obtained by a subjective rating on a
10-point scale, and also indicated by the frequency of tossing a coin in each condition.
Promotion-focused individuals were found to be more confident in the selection task
than in the rejection task, and the reverse was true for the prevention-focused
individuals.
Unlike the above studies involving options that are overall attractive or
unattractive, some earlier studies focused on the features that compose the options
being positive or negative, and found more interesting and puzzling results: When
paired with an option containing average features, an option containing both more
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positive and more negative features can be preferred to different degrees in a selection
task than in a rejection task.
Shafir (1993) examined compatibility between positive and negative features of
alternatives and the decision task frames (selection and rejection), and proposed that
positive features are weighted more in the selection task and negative features of the
options are weighted more in the rejection task. Two types of options were constructed
and used, the enriched and the impoverished options. The enriched option had more
positive as well as more negative features than the impoverished one. Shafir found that
for a selection task in which participants needed to award or indicate a preference for
one of the options, the enriched option was preferred more than for a rejection task in
which participants were to deny or give up one of the options.
As an example, Shafir (1993) included a problem of an only-child sole-custody
case, for which participants were supposed to serve on the jury to decide to award or
deny sole custody of the child to which parent:
Imagine that you serve on the jury of an only-child sole-custody case
following a relatively messy divorce. The facts of the case are
complicated by ambiguous economic, social, and emotional
considerations, and you decide to base your decision entirely on the
following few observations. [To which parent would you award sole
custody of the child? / Which parent would you deny sole custody of the
child?]
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Parent A

average income
average health
average working hours
reasonable rapport with the child
relatively stable social life

Parent B

above-average income
very close relationship with the child
extremely active social life
lots of work-related travel
minor health problems (p. 549)

In this example, Parent B (the enriched option) had more positive as well as more
negative features than Parent A (the impoverished option). If procedure invariance
holds, the percentages of each parent being selected and rejected should sum to 100.
However, Shafir found that when deciding which parent to award sole custody, Parent
A was chosen (i.e., selected) by 36% of the participants, and Parent B 64%; when
deciding which parent to deny sole custody, Parent A was chosen (i.e., rejected) by
45% of the participants, and Parent B 55%. The enriched option Parent B was preferred
by 64% of the participants in the selection task but was preferred by 45% of the
participants in the rejection task. The results were consistent with the concept of
compatibility. The positive features were more compatible with the selection task
because people seek “good” reasons to select an option, whereas the negative features
were more compatible with the rejection task because people seek “bad” reasons to
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reject an option. Thus, the enriched option, which contained more positive as well as
more negative features, was preferred more often in the selection task than in the
rejection task.
The Accentuation Account
In the following years, Ganzach (1995) and Wedell (1997) followed up Shafir’s
(1993) study, providing different evidence and alternative accounts. Ganzach proposed
that people have higher commitment in the selection task than in the rejection task
because “one has to live with the alternative he accepts, but not with the alternative he
rejects” (p. 115). With a higher commitment level, people tend to be more critical and
focus more on the negative attributes of the options. Ganzach’s Experiment 2 included
a filler option, which was clearly not the intended answer and thus can be ignored in
the current discussion, in addition to two experimental options similar to the enriched
and impoverished options in Shafir’s study. Participants were required to select or
reject a job candidate out of each triplet. Contradictory with Shafir’s results, Ganzach
found that the enriched options were preferred more in the rejection task than in the
selection task (see also Carlson & Bond, 2006).
Wedell (1997) proposed an accentuation account to explain both data sets from
Shafir’s (1993) and Ganzach’s (1995) studies. Wedell noted that the overall
attractiveness of the enriched options was generally higher than the impoverished
options in Shafir’s study, and the opposite was true in Ganzach’s study (See Figure 1).
According to the accentuation account, people are more discriminating and differences
between alternatives are accentuated more in the selection task than in the rejection
task. This difference is due to the assumptions that (1) there is greater commitment or
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need for justification in the selection task than in the rejection task and (2) justification
requires discriminating and accentuating the differences between the options. Thus,
when the overall attractiveness of one option is greater than that of the other option,
participants’ preferences for the more attractive option will be higher in the selection
task than in the rejection task.
Wedell (1997) first analyzed the data from Shafir (1993) and Ganzach (1995),
by plotting the “proportion preferring enriched” against the “overall proportion
preferring enriched” to show the relation between them in the selection and rejection
tasks separately. The “proportion preferring enriched” refers to the percentage the
enriched option being selected in the selection task or it not being rejected in the
rejection task, whereas the “overall proportion preferring enriched” refers to the
average of the above two values and serves as a measure for the relative attractiveness
of the enriched option. The combined data set showed a deeper slope for the selectiontask line compared to the rejection-task line, meaning the selection task was affected by
the relative attractiveness of options more than was the rejection task.
Wedell (1997) then conducted two experiments to verify the accentuation
account directly. In his Experiment 1, which was with a similar design as the current
study, 26 preference problems similar to those used by Shafir (1993) were presented to
participants in either the selection or rejection frame. The problems were constructed
so that the overall proportion of the enriched option being preferred was spreading
from 30% to 70%. These new data showed the same pattern as the combined data from
the previous two studies, in which the data pattern were similar to Shafir’s results when
the enriched option was more attractive and consistent with Ganzach’s (1995) results

13
when the impoverished option was more attractive. These results were consistent with
the accentuation model that people are more discriminating in the selection than in the
rejection task: Compared with the rejection task, people in the selection task prefer the
more attractive option more often and the less attractive option less often.
Information-Processing Approach
The information-processing approach has been proposed to “focus on the
processes of judgment and choice and use various methods to trace decision
processing” (Payne & Bettman, 2004, p. 111; see also Glaholt & Reingold, 2011).
These process-tracing methods include but are not limited to: Verbal protocols (e.g.,
Meloy & Russo, 2004; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997; Payne, 1976), monitoring of
information search (e.g., eye-movement tracking; Rubaltelli et al., 2012; computerized
information retrieval systems; Edwards & Fasolo, 2001), and response times (e.g.,
Bettman, Johnson, & Payne, 1990; Nagpal & Krishnamurthy, 2008). These methods
emphasize how the decisions are made rather than just what the final decisions are.
Verbal Protocols
Verbal protocols are self-reports of participants’ on-going decision-making
processes, although they may influence the processes (Brand, Reimer, & Opwis, 2003;
Hertzum & Holmegaard, 2015). Verbal protocols can provide the level of details and
insights that are not provided by eye-tracking and other types of process markers
(Payne, Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978; Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989). Two
common types of verbal protocol methods are concurrent protocols (while preforming
the task) and retrospective protocols (upon completion of the task). Both methods have
advantages and disadvantages (Kuusela & Pallab, 2000; Peute, de Keizer, & Jaspers,
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2015; Whyte, Cormier, & Pickett-Hauber, 2010)): Concurrent protocols may alter the
accuracy of the tasks (Hertzum & Holmegaard, 2015), whereas retrospective protocols
could induce forgetting even with cues of the stimuli or responses (Russo et al., 1989)
and result in evaluation of the task rather than recall of thoughts during the task
(Gonzalez, 2003).
As an example for the use of verbal protocols in a study of task framing, Meloy
and Russo (2004) used the concurrent verbal protocol method in examining the
compatibility between decision frame (selection or rejection) and the valence of the
alternatives (positive or negative). They created alternatives composed of only positive
or negative features, so that selecting between the two positive alternatives or rejecting
between the two negative alternatives were compatible conditions, and selecting
between negative alternatives and rejecting between positive alternatives were
incompatible conditions. Meloy and Russo found that task reframing (e.g.,
transforming a selection task into a rejection task) revealed by the verbal protocol data
occurred more often in the incompatible conditions than in the compatible conditions.
Eye-Movement Tracking
Eye-tracking data can be used to reveal the decision maker’s information search
processing, and are less intrusive than other process-tracing methods such as
information boards and mouse-tracing methods (Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Orquin &
Loose, 2013; Scholz, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2015). Typical measures in the
decision making studies are: Number of fixations as a measure of cognitive effort or
amount of information search; mean fixation duration as a measure for processing
depth or effort; number of fixations and total fixation as measures for level of attention;
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sequence of fixations as a measure of processing or information search pattern
(Glöckner & Herbold, 2011; Kang & Landry, 2014; Rubaltelli et al., 2012;
Venkatraman, Payne, & Huettel, 2014).
Regarding task framing, Rubaltelli et al.’s (2012) collected eye-tracking data
from participants performing both an attractiveness rating task and a pricing task for
different gambles problems. More fixations were found on the payoffs than on the
associated probabilities in a pricing task, whereas the amount of fixations was similar
on both the payoffs and the probabilities in an attractiveness-rating task. This result
pattern is consistent with the assumption that the pricing task is more compatible with
the payoffs of the options and the rating task is more compatible with the probabilities.
Kuo et al. (2009) explored how the level of cognitive effort involved in decisions was
influenced by positive and negative framing. Note that the framing was in terms of the
information framing of the question (e.g., 200 people will be saved vs. 400 people will
die) rather than the task framing. Total time spent and number of eye fixations on each
problem were used as measures of cognitive effort. These eye-movement measures
showed that participants expended more effort on the problems under the negative
framing than under the positive framing. The rationale was that the positive and
negative framing elicited positive and negative emotion, respectively, which exert
different levels of cognitive effort in information processing (i.e., more negative
emotion leads to higher motivation).
Decision Time
“Response time can provide insights into the process of deliberation prior to
making a decision” (Rubinstein, 2013). The response time approach has been used
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especially when different theories have identical predictions of the outcome (choice)
data but predict different decision-making processes that lead to different response
times (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Glöckner, 2007). For example, Nagpal and
Krishnamurthy (2008) used decision time as one of the dependent variables, and found
that time of processing was affected by the compatibility between task frame and
valence of options: Decisions for attractive options were faster than those for
unattractive options in a selection task, and the reverse was true for a rejection task.
They proposed that the incompatibility between the (un)attractiveness and the decision
task leads to longer decision time.
Time and effort go hand in hand. Decision time has been used as a measure of
decision effort (Bettman et al., 1990; Bettman & Zins, 1979; Hoyer, 1984). Hoyer
studied consumers’ behavior on relatively unimportant and repeated purchases, using
an in-person observation method. The observer recorded the amount of time taken and
number of within-brand and cross-brand comparisons made by the consumers before
they bought a certain brand of laundry detergent. On average it took the consumers 13
s to make a purchase decision, and most of them only examined one or two products
before their final purchase choice. Hoyer concluded that “the typical consumer is
making an extremely quick decision with only a minimal degree of cognitive effort in
the store environment” (p. 826).
Bettman et al. (1990) used decision times (i.e., latencies) and self-reported task
difficulty as measures for the effort required when using different decision strategies.
They proposed a model of effort using weighted elementary information processes
(EIPs) for describing strategies. The proposed model provided good fits when decision
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times and self-reported effort were used as an indicator of effort, respectively, and the
weighted EIPs model fit better especially on decision times. Time spent and the selfreported effort were not perfectly correlated, but decision time was a relatively
preferred measure because people may not be able to subjectively report their cognitive
effort accurately.
Influence of Time Pressure
In reality, people sometimes need to make decisions under time pressure. For
example, a person may need to decide which stock(s) to buy or to sell in a timely
manner (Nursimulu & Bossaerts, 2014). Decision making is sensitive to time pressure
(Slovic, 1995; Suter & Hertwig, 2011). There is evidence that people may use different
information-processing strategies, speed up the information processing with the same
strategies (Ordóñez & Benson, 1997), or change the decision criterion (Diederich,
2003) under time pressure than when decision speed is not critical. For example, under
time pressure, people may attend more to general category information about the
problem (Maule, Hockey, & Bdzola, 2000) or concentrate on more important attributes
and relevant information (Edland, 1993).
Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson (2000) retested a common finding
that risk and benefit of an activity are inversely related in people’s mind despite the
fact that they are positively related in the physical world. This finding was proposed to
be due to the overall affective evaluation of the activity (see also Slovic, Peters,
Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). Participants were required to rate the risk and benefit
of various targets either with or without time pressure. This negative correlation
between perceived risk and benefit was found to become stronger when the participants

18
were under time pressure. Finucane et al. concluded that time pressure reduced the
analytic processes and increased the reliance on affective processes in this type of
risk/benefit judgment.
Present Study
The seemingly conflicting finding that the same option is preferred to different
degrees under the selection and rejection task frames is interesting because it is a
violation of procedure invariance, which is a crucial component in theories of rational
decision. The different result patterns and theoretical explanations provided by Shafir
(1993) and Wedell (1997) deserve further examination. Note that both accounts
emphasize the importance of the decision tasks, though in different manners.
According to the compatibility account, the relation between the valence of features in
the options and the nature of the tasks is the crucial factor that leads to changes in
preference across the tasks, especially when the two options are otherwise comparable.
According to the accentuation account, changes in preferences in the two tasks, which
have different levels of need for justification, depend on the relative attractiveness of
the two options, and the more (less) attractive option is preferred more (less) in the
selection task because people have more commitment involved under this task frame.
Despite its significance, this discrepancy has been ignored in the decisionmaking literature, along with little attention being paid to the compatibility principle in
the field. As of May 29, 2015, Shafir’s (1993) study has been cited 152 times in
PsycINFO, whereas Wedell’s (1997) article, which proposed the conflict, has been
cited only 15 times. Among the latter citations, only two articles discussed this
discrepancy, one of which supported the compatibility account (Meloy & Russo, 2004)
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but the other of which suggested evidence in favor of the accentuation account
(Colombo, Nicotra, & Marino, 2002). Rather than the actual choice made by
participants, Meloy and Russo focused on the commitment to the chosen alternative
(measured by a certainty rating on the final choice made), accentuation of attribute
difference (measured by how much the evaluation of the alternatives deviate from the
midpoint on a 9-point scale), and predecisional distortion of information (measured by
comparing the ratings from the participants who were required to make a choice to
those who did not need to make a choice). Colombo et al. used a small number of
participants (34 or 36 participants in each condition) and only included problems in
which the overall preference of the enriched option was lower than .50.
The present study was motivated by this issue to revisit the enrichedimpoverished paradigm, with the aim of investigating how decision task frame
influences preferences. The goal was to test the compatibility and accentuation
accounts, and to propose an alternative account to explain the results if necessary. The
compatibility account and accentuation account provide different insights into the role
of task frame. The former suggests that selection and rejection tasks influence decision
making by putting more weights on the features compatible with the task, and the latter
proposes that people are discriminating in the selection task due to higher level of
commitment. These different views were supported by data from Shafir (1993) and
Wedell (1997), respectively. Thus, to understand how indeed the selection and
rejection task frames function or which of the two accounts captures the role of task
frame correctly, the result pattern in previous studies needs to be verified. In all the
current experiments, there were 30 problems in total: the 26 problems used by Wedell,
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three of which were also used by Shafir, in addition to four new gamble problems that
are similar to the gamble problems used by Shafir.
In general, the primary measures in the experiments include the choices
participants made, the verbal protocols, and eye-movement data. In addition, response
time, satisfaction level, and confidence level were also compared across the two task
frames for the 30 problems. The comparison results can be informative for examining
how task frames influence choices and information-search patterns, and which task
frame is superior by saving more time, leading to more satisfaction, and/or yielding
more confidence.
Experiment 1 was conducted online with the 30 problems on introductory
psychology students through Sona (purdue-psych.sona-systems.com), and participants
performed either a selection or rejection task on all the problems. Following each
problem, participants were required to rate their satisfaction and confidence regarding
the choice they just made. A pattern that was similar to Wedell’s (1997) results
predicted by the accentuation account was obtained: Participants were more
discriminating in the selection than in the rejection task as indicated by a deeper
regression line in the selection task.
Experiment 2 applied a verbal protocol method in a laboratory setting.
Participants worked on the same 30 problems while being required to verbally report
their thoughts during decision making. Surprisingly, the choice data showed no
difference under the two task frames, possibly due to the need for verbalization of
reasons for their choices or to the finding that more than half participants in the
rejection task were confused about the task at the beginning of the experiment. The
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verbal-protocol data showed that participants in both tasks mentioned the positive
features roughly the same, but the negative features were mentioned more in the
rejection task than in the selection task, consistent with the compatibility account. The
need for verbalization of the reasons promoted the strategy that fits with the
compatibility account, which is a reason-based approach to understanding decisions
(Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993).
The questionnaires in Experiment 3 were modified based on those used in
Experiment 1 to make the task requirements clearer. This experiment was conducted on
Sona as well as on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk, www.mturk.com) to obtain data
from different participant populations. The difference between the two task frames was
smaller than that in Experiment 1, but was still evident. The results indicated that task
confusion may have contributed to the non-task-framing effect in Experiment 2, but it
was not the whole story. Thus, in Experiment 2 the need for verbalization of reasons
reduced the difference in choice between the two task frames, and Experiment 3
confirmed the result pattern that supports the accentuation account.
Experiment 4 obtained the relative attractiveness of the two options in each
problems directly by requiring participants to rate the likelihood they would
select/reject an option. This relative attractiveness rating is highly correlated with the
overall proportion preferring the options used in previous experiments. All data in
previous experiments were reanalyzed with these new attractiveness ratings and similar
result patterns were found.
Experiment 5 utilized the eye-tracking technique to collect participants’ eyemovement patterns in a laboratory setting. The purpose was to evaluate how
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participants search information under different task frames, and to seek patterns that fit
with one of the two accounts. Not much difference in the eye movements was found
between the task frames, but a measure for cognitive effort (i.e., average fixation
duration) showed more cognitive effort was involved in the rejection task than in the
selection task. The choice data once again were consistent with the accentuation
account, although the eye-movement data indicated that the difference between the two
tasks was due to the rejection task being more effortful.
Experiments 6 and 7 included time constraints in an MTurk experiment similar
to Experiment 3. Participants in Experiment 6 were required to respond within a time
limit for each problem, and participants in Experiment 7 were not able to respond
before a period of time. The result patterns in the last two experiments turned out to be
similar to the pattern obtained in Experiment 3, which indicates that the accentuation
process is relatively automatic.
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EXPERIMENT 1. ONLINE CHOICE TASK ON SONA
The purpose of this experiment was to verify the result pattern of how task
framing influences people’s preferences, that is, to examine whether the result pattern
of Wedell (1997; in support of the accentuation account) or Shafir (1993; in support of
the compatibility account), or a new result pattern, was obtained in the current
experiment setting. On the one hand, if the compatibility account explains the task
framing effect, the enriched option will be preferred more often in the selection task
(i.e., being selected) than in the rejection task (i.e., not being rejected), and this
difference will not be influenced by the relative attractiveness of the two options. On
the other hand, if the accentuation account holds, the more attractive option, regardless
of whether it is enriched or impoverished, will be preferred more in the selection task
than in the rejection task.
Method
Participants
Participants were 250 (99 female) Purdue University undergraduate students
who participated for experimental credits in an introductory psychology course. The
average age was 19.4 (± 1.1) years old.
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Apparatus and Stimuli
The experimental task was composed of 30 binary-choice problems regarding
different scenarios in daily life, such as choosing a restaurant, university, and daycare
(see Appendix C). These problems were adapted from those used by Wedell (1997)
and some by Shafir (1993). Each problem had two options, an enriched option and an
impoverished option. The enriched option contained both very positive and very
negative features, and the impoverished option contained similar, but more average
features.
The problems were constructed and presented by Qualtrics
(https://purdue.qualtrics.com). The order of the problems was randomly assigned to
each participant. When presenting the problems, general information regarding the
scenario and the decision task was presented on top of the page, and the two options
were presented side-by-side below the general information. In this experiment, the
enriched option was always presented to the left of the impoverished option. The
features were presented in the same order in both options so that a feature in the
enriched option was in the same line as that feature in the impoverished option.
However, the order of the features within each option was counterbalanced across
participants: In the enriched option the positive features were presented above the
negative features for half of the participants, and the reversed feature order was used
for the other half of the participants; in the impoverished option, the features were
presented in the same order as those in the enriched option.
The decision task was either a selection or a rejection task, and participants
were randomly assigned to one of the task frames. In the selection task, participants
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were to select the more favorable option, and in the rejection task the participants were
to reject the less favorable option. The scenarios in the rejection tasks were similar to
those in the selection tasks, but were worded to indicate that a “rejection” (e.g., return
an extra computer) was needed.
Following each problem were two questions “How satisfied are you with the
decision you just made?” and “How confident are you about the choice you just
made?” The answers for both questions were 10-point, with 1 meaning “very
dissatisfied” or “very unconfident”, and 10 meaning “very satisfied” and “very
confident”.
Design and Procedure
Participants were given a link to the online questionnaire once they signed up
for the experiment through an experiment registration system (Sona; purduepsych.sona-systems.com), and they were randomly assigned to one of four betweensubjects conditions based on a combination of feature order (positive-to-negative vs.
negative-to-positive) and task frame (selection vs. rejection).
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were instructed to minimize
the background noise or distraction in the environment and were told, “You will be
presented with a number of problems, for each of which you need to choose an option.
Please take as much time as you need.” Each problem was presented on a single page,
followed by a second page containing the satisfaction and confidence questions.
Participants needed to click on a “next” button located on the right bottom of the page
to proceed to the next page, and were not able to go back to the previous pages. The
time to submit the first page of each problem (i.e., to complete the selection or rejection

26
task) was recorded by Qualtrics, but participants were not informed of this timing
recording, and they were allowed as much time as they needed to work on the
problems. A statement “You have completed [x] of 30 questions” with [x] referring to
the number of completed problems was shown below the “next” button. After
completing all 30 problems, participants were instructed to send a randomly generated
code to the experimenter by email in order to get the experimental credit.
Results
Outlier Trials
All participants were included in the following analyses. To improve the quality
of the data, lower and upper cutoffs for response time (RT, i.e., time to complete each
problem) were used. The lower cutoff for RT was determined based on the reading
speed of an average adult
(http://www.humanfactors.com/newsletters/human_interaction_speeds.asp), which is
around 250 to 300 words per minute. For each problem, the assumption for the fastest
possible speed was that the participants were reading with the fastest average speed of
300 words per minute, and were only reading the two options in the problem. For
example, if a problem has x words in the problem title, y words in option A, and z
words in option B, then the lower cutoff for this problem is (y + z)/300*60 seconds.
Note that this cutoff is relatively conservative so that not too many data were excluded
from the analyses. A higher cutoff was set arbitrarily at 500 ms, the purpose of which
was to exclude occasional long trials. These two cutoffs excluded 24.1% of the total
trials, which may be due to participants not paying enough attention to the task or
submitting the page accidently. Mean and standard deviation of the remaining trials
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were calculated for each problem in the selection and rejection tasks separately, and an
M ± 3SD cutoff was used to further clean the data, which excluded additional 1.7% of
the total trials.
Choice Data
The percentage of selecting or rejecting an option was then computed for each
problem by averaging across the participants. The overall proportion of the enriched
option being preferred was computed in the same way as in Wedell (1997, Experiment
1), by aggregating proportions of the enriched option being preferred in the selection
and rejection tasks (i.e., the percentage of an enriched option being selected and that of
the corresponding impoverished option being rejected).
The proportions preferring the enriched option in the selection and rejection
tasks were plotted against the overall proportion of the enriched option being preferred
to form two regression lines. An overlap between the two lines representing the
selection and rejection tasks would indicate that there was no influence of the task
frame. Otherwise, the compatibility account predicts the selection line to be higher than
the rejection line and the two lines to be parallel; in contrast, the accentuation account
predicts a crossover of the two lines, with the selection line having a steeper slope than
the rejection line (see Figure 2).
The results showed a similar pattern (see Figure 3) to that predicted by the
accentuation account. The overall proportion preferring the enriched option explains a
significant amount of the variance in the proportion preferring the enriched option for
both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 584.48, p < .001, R2 = .977, R2Adjusted = .953, and the
rejection task, F(1, 28) = 167.11, p < .001, R2 = .925, R2Adjusted = .851. The coefficients
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of the two regression functions were significant, for both the selection task, Beta =
1.304, t(29) = 24.18, p < .001, and the rejection task, Beta = 0.697, t(29) = 12.93, p
< .001. The coefficients were 1.20 and 0.82 for the selection and reject tasks,
respectively, for Wedell’s (1997) data. More important, the difference between the two
coefficients was also significant, t(29) = 7.96, p < .001.
Note that the two regression lines were not independent and the sum of the two
regression coefficients was always 2. This dependence was because the overall
proportion preferring the enriched option (i.e., the x axis) was an average of the values
on the two lines representing the selection and rejection tasks. Later, in Experiment 4, a
direct measure of the relative attractiveness of the enriched option was obtained and
used as the x axis. Using this new measure made the two lines independent, yet the
new regression lines looked similar to the original ones (see the bottom panels in
Figures 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13).
Decision Time
The mean time to complete each problem, recorded as the time used to submit
each page, was used for the timing analysis. A repeated-measures ANOVA was
conducted on the decision time with task frame (selection vs. rejection), feature order
(positive-negative vs. negative-positive) as within-subject variables. There were main
effects of task frame (Ms = 25.21 vs. 27.88 s for selection and rejection tasks,
respectively), F(1, 29) = 27.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .49, and feature order (Ms = 25.00 vs.
28.08 s for the positive-negative and negative-positive feature orders, respectively),
F(1, 29) = 45.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, but no significant interaction between these two
variables, F(1, 29) = .02, p = .882, ηp2 = .00.
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Subjective Ratings
Similar ANOVAs were conducted on the satisfaction and confidence ratings
following each choice problem. Across all the experiments in the current study, the
results regarding the effect of task frame on these subjective ratings were not
consistent, so these data are put in Appendix D.
Discussion
First of all, the current experiment showed a difference in the selection and
rejection tasks, confirming a task framing effect. It is straightforward, and shown by
the positive slopes of both the selection and rejection lines in Figure 1, that the
proportion of one option being preferred in either task should be positively correlated
to the relative attractiveness of this option (indicated by the overall proportion of this
option being preferred in both tasks). Yet, the option was preferred more in the
selection than in the rejection task if it had high attractiveness, and preferred less in the
selection than in the rejection task if it had a low attractiveness. In other words, the
relative attractiveness had a more profound effect in the selection task than in the
rejection task, that is, people are more discriminating in the selection task.
In binary-choice tasks, the selection and rejection tasks were logically
complimentary, by which different framings of one problem should lead to the same
preference of the decision maker. The current experiment violated this principle of
procedure invariance. Moreover, the results in this experiment were consistent with the
accentuation account proposed by Wedell (1997). The accentuation account claims that
people have higher commitment level in the selection task than in the rejection task,
and thus accentuate the difference more in the selection task. The accentuated
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differences are reflected by selecting the more attractive option more and the less
attractive option less in the selection task.
In addition, the decision times were shorter in the selection task than those in
the rejection task. In other words, the selection task frame took less time while people
managed to be more discriminating. These results imply that the selection task frame
may be a “superior” task frame for people to make decision. So if people have “real”
preferences, those should be in line with the answers revealed under the selection task
frame.
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EXPERIMENT 2. IN-LAB CHOICE TASK WITH VERBAL PROTOCOLS
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate how participants make a
certain choice and what their information-processing patterns are under the selection
and rejection tasks. Both the accentuation account and the compatibility account are
aimed at explaining the underlying decision-making processes, yet Experiment 1 and
previous studies (Ganzach, 1995; Shafir, 1993; Wedell, 1997) all focus on the decision
outcomes under different task frames. Thus, more process-tracing data is needed to
directly reveal the underlying processes that make a difference under the two task
frames. Experiment 2 used the method of concurrent verbal protocols (or “think
aloud”), which has been used to uncover people’s thoughts while performing a certain
task. To complement the outcome data from Experiment 1, this experiment was
conducted in a laboratory setting to obtain detailed data on people’s thoughts as to how
and why they make the decisions.
Method
Participants
Forty-one (13 females; average age 19.7 ± 1.4) Purdue University
undergraduate students participated for experimental credits in an introductory
psychology course. These students did not participate in Experiment 1.
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Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus and stimuli were similar to Experiment 1 except that participants
were invited to the lab, and the experiment was conducted on a computer located in a
quiet cubicle.
Design and Procedure
The design and procedure were similar to Experiment 1 except that the
researcher sat in the cubicle next to the participant, and the participant was required to
“think aloud” during the experiment. Participants were told, “Please speak out your
thoughts while working on these problems. You will be reminded by the experimenter
if you have kept silent for more than 30 s.” This 30-s cutoff was adopted from the
methods in Hertzum and Holmegaard (2015). They were also encouraged to focus on
how and why they make the decisions. Participants’ vocal responses were recorded
with their permission. Half of the auditory recording of one participant was missing
due to a failure of the recording device. All the remaining auditory recordings were
transcribed by the researcher and two undergraduate research assistants. The transcripts
were then coded separately by the same two undergraduate researchers, who were
naive to the purpose of the study.
Results
All participants were included in the following analyses, except one who
ignored the instruction and did not report verbally as required. Half of the remaining 40
participants performed the selection task, and the other half performed the rejection
task.
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Choice Data
The regression lines were plotted using the same method as in Experiment 1.
The overall proportion preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of
the variance in the proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task,
F(1, 28) = 83.52, p < .001, R2 = .865, R2Adjusted = .740, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) =
77.00, p < .001, R2 = .856, R2Adjusted = .724. The coefficients of the two regression
functions were significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.036, t(29) = 9.14, p
< .001, and the rejection task, Beta = 1.002, t(29) = 8.78, p < .001. Different from
Experiment 1, the difference between the two coefficients was not significant, t(29)
= .21, p = .834. The lines for the selection and rejection tasks were almost overlapped
entirely with each other (see Figure 4), indicating that there was no difference between
the two task frames in terms of which choice participants made.
Decision Time
Treating each problem as an experimental unit, repeated-measure ANOVAs
were conducted on decision time, satisfaction rating, and confidence rating, with task
frame (selection vs. rejection) and feature order (positive-negative vs. negativepositive) as within-subject variables.
There were significant main effects of task frame (Ms = 44.87 vs. 51.03 s for
selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 91.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, and
feature order (Ms = 49.05 and 46.85 s for positive-negative and negative-positive
feature orders, respectively), F(1, 29) = 6.33, p = .018, ηp2 = .18, and an interaction
between them, F(1, 29) = 10.77, p = .003, ηp2 = .27. The selection task took longer for
the positive-negative feature order than for the negative-positive feature order (Ms =
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47.34 vs. 42.39 s), whereas the rejection task did not show a similar difference due to
the feature order (Ms = 50.77 vs. 51.30 s).
Participant-Based Verbal Protocol Data
The verbal protocol data were transcribed by the researcher and two
undergraduate research assistants word-by-word. Then the two research assistants, who
were naive to the purpose of this study, coded the transcripts for each problem and for
each participant. For each problem, they generated four ratings for whether the
participant mentioned (coded as 1) the positive or negative features of the enriched or
impoverished option or not (coded as 0). The research assistants were instructed to
code the data independently based on their own understanding of the transcripts. The
ratings of the two assistants were highly correlated, Pearson’s r = .950, n = 160, p
< .001, and the average of the two sets of ratings were used in subsequent analyses.
For each participant, four data points were obtained by aggregating data across
all problems and were used in the following analysis: the frequency of the
positive/negative features mentioned in the enriched/impoverished options. A repeatedmeasure ANOVA was conducted with (positive vs. negative) feature and (enriched vs.
impoverished) option as within-subject variables, and (selection vs. rejection) task as a
between-subject variable. (Feature order did not have any significant effect and thus
was not included as a factor in the analysis.) There were significant main effects of
feature (Ms = 15.8 vs. 10.8 for positive and negative features, respectively), F(1, 38) =
96.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .72, and option type (Ms = 16.6 vs. 10.0 for enriched and
impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 38) = 154.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .80. There were
also significant interactions between feature and task (positive features were mentioned
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roughly equally for both the selection and rejection tasks, Ms = 16.0 vs. 15.6, but
negative features were mentioned more in the rejection task than in the selection task,
Ms = 11.8 vs. 9.5; see Figure 5 top), F(1, 38) = 7.21, p = .011, ηp2 = .16, and between
feature and option type (the difference between enriched and impoverished options was
smaller for the positive features, Ms = 18.1 vs. 13.5, than for the negative features, Ms
= 15.1 vs. 6.4; see Figure 6 top), F(1, 38) = 11.37, p = .002, ηp2 = .23. No other effects
were significant, ps > .110.
Problem-Based Verbal Protocol Data
Problem-based analysis showed a similar pattern except that the difference
between the selection and rejection tasks was significant.
In this analysis, each problem was treated as an experimental unit. For each
problem, eight data points were obtained by aggregating data across all participants and
used in the following analysis: the frequency of the positive/negative features
mentioned in the enriched/impoverished options for the selection/rejection tasks. A
repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted with (positive vs. negative) feature,
(enriched vs. impoverished) option, and (selection vs. rejection) task as variables.
There were significant main effects of feature (Ms = 10.5 vs. 7.2 for positive and
negative features, respectively), F(1, 29) = 180.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .86, option type (Ms
= 11.1 vs. 6.6 for enriched and impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 29) = 67.42, p
< .001, ηp2 = .70, and task (Ms = 8.5 vs. 9.2 for selection and rejection tasks,
respectively), F(1, 29) = 11.76, p = .002, ηp2 = .29.
There were also significant interactions between feature and task (positive
features were mentioned roughly equally for both the selection and rejection tasks, Ms
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= 10.6 vs. 10.4, but negative features were mentioned more in the rejection task than in
the selection task, Ms = 8.0 vs. 6.4; see Figure 5 bottom), F(1, 29) = 23.15, p < .001,
ηp2 = .44, and between feature and option (the difference between enriched and
impoverished options was smaller for the positive features, Ms = 12.0 vs. 9.0, than for
the negative features, Ms = 10.1 vs. 4.3; see Figure 6 bottom), F(1, 29) = 5.23, p
= .030, ηp2 = .15. No other effects were significant, ps > .139.
To compute how much the participants considered the features of the enriched
option relative to the features of the impoverished option, the relative weights

were used, where EO represents enriched option and IO represents impoverished
option. The relative weights for positive/negative features in the selection and
rejection tasks were plotted against the relative attractiveness of the enriched options
obtained in Experiment 4 (see later). Figure 7 shows that the positive features seem to
have a greater effect in the selection task (comparison between the solid vs. dashed
black lines) and the negative features seem to have a greater effect in the rejection task
(comparison between the solid vs. dashed red lines), but these differences were not
statistically significant, ts < 1.
Discussion
In Experiment 2, participants were invited to the lab and to “think aloud” while
they were performing the same task as participants in Experiment 1. The choice data
from these participants showed no difference between the selection and rejection tasks
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– people were equally discriminating under both task frames. The participants from
both experiments were from the same participant pool, yet they showed very different
result patterns in terms of the choice preferences. There are two possible reasons why
the result pattern in this experiment differed from that in Experiment 1.
For one possible reason, the need for verbalization of reasons for decisionmaking leads participants to think more about the problems and make more rational
decisions. When asked about their thoughts about the experiment at the end, one
participant commented that “… speaking it out makes me think more”. The verbal
protocol method has been shown in some studies to enhance problem-solving
performance (Brand et al., 2003), reduce the overestimation of time taken for a task
(Hertzum & Holmegaard, 2015), and alter the accuracy in a simple addition and a
gamble choice task (Russo et al., 1989). Although not directly tested on the verbal
protocols method, some other types of process-tracing methods have been proposed to
hinder automatic processing in decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). In two of
Shafir’s (1993) problems, participants were asked to provide justifications for their
choice by writing down the reasons upon making their decision. He found a significant
effect of the enriched option being selected and rejected more often than the
impoverished option in one problem but not in the other one. The verbal protocols
procedure used in Experiment 2 may have elicited more needs of justification than the
written procedure. It is reasonable to speculate that people rely on more deliberative
thinking and become more “rational” with the think-aloud task requirement.
The other possible reason is that a portion of the online participants in the
rejection task may have misunderstood the task frame as a selection task for at least the
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first few questions. Note that more than half (12) of the 20 participants in the rejection
condition of Experiment 2 understood the first question incorrectly by taking it as a
selection task, until I reminded them that it was a rejection task. This reversal of the
task frame was not eliminated in Experiment 1 and could have led to the results in the
rejection task being neutralized, reflected by a flatter regression line in the rejection
task. This speculation was also consistent with a previous finding by Shafir (1993), in
which 59% of a group of participants reported paraphrasing the rejection question into
the selection question, but only 14% reported paraphrasing the question in the opposite
direction. Thus, it is reasonable to attribute the difference between the above two
experiments to people being more easily confused by the rejection task especially when
they are left alone to perform the tasks without proper feedback.
Regarding the selection and rejection tasks, participants in both tasks mentioned
the positive features equally but the rejection task led participants to think about the
negative features more, which is in line with the compatibility account. The
compatibility account is a reason-based approach, which proposes that when making
decision, people seek and construct reasons to justify their choices (Shafir et al., 1993).
The verbal protocols in this experiment required participants to speak out their
thoughts, especially how they make the choices. These requirements may have
promoted the participants to adopt strategies (e.g., seeking good reasons to select one
option and bad reasons to reject one option) that fit with the compatibility account.
To conclude, the different result patterns obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 may
have been due to the online participants being more confused about the rejection task
and/or the task requirements for verbalization of reasons imposed by the think-aloud
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method. In addition, the two theoretical explanations may not be mutually exclusive,
but different strategies people could take under different task requirements.
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EXPERIMENT 3. ONLINE CHOICE TASKS EMPHASIZING TASK FRAMES
One possible reason for the difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is that
participants in Experiment 1 may have been confused about the task (especially the
rejection task) without proper feedback. Experiment 3 emphasized the task frame with
a modified version of the questionnaires. The modifications in the questionnaire
included: (a) highlighting the word “choose” or “reject” in the instruction in bold and
red; (b) reducing the number of questions from 30 to 15 for each participant; (c)
including a practice question with clearly better and worse options at the beginning of
the experiment, for which participants would get prominent feedback if they did not
follow the task correctly; (d) adding a final question at the end to test the participant on
whether the task was to select or to reject an option to determine whether s/he
understood the task. The purpose of these modifications was to reduce or eliminate the
possibility that participants in the rejection task mistake the task as a selection task, and
thus to distinguish the accentuation and compatibility accounts without this possible
confounding.
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EXPERIMENT 3A MTURK PARTICIPANTS

Method
Participants and Experiment Platform
For faster and more convenient data collection, 604 participants were recruited
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk; www.mturk.com). MTurk is a large online
crowdsourcing platform that allows “requesters” (e.g., social science researchers,
business firms) to collect human-intelligence data from “workers”, who perform the
tasks (named as Human Intelligence Task, or HIT) posted by the requesters and get
paid (or sometimes for free). The MTurk workers for this and later MTurk experiments
were required to be located in US and have a HIT approval rate equal to or greater than
95%.
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure
The apparatus, stimuli, design, and procedure were similar to Experiment 1
except the following aspects. The experiment was posted on MTurk and took about 10
minutes on average with a payment of $0.25. At the very beginning of the experiment,
participants were shown a unique picture taken by the researcher (see Figure 8), and
they were told to participate in the experiment only if this was the first time they saw
the picture. This same procedure was used in all the MTurk experiments throughout
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this study to try to ensure that participants participated in the experiment only once and
had not participated in other similar experiments from this study.
To increase the quality of the responses, each participant answered 15 problems
randomly drawn from the total 30 problems. The relative location of the enriched
option and the impoverished option was randomized for each problem. In the
instructions, participants in the selection condition were told, “For each problem you
need to choose [in red] an option you like.” Those in the rejection condition were told,
“For each problem you need to reject [in red] an option you dislike.” In addition to
these instructions, the following practice problem was presented to all participants
before they started the 15 problems:
Imagine that you were invited to play one of the following two lotteries.
Which one would you prefer (reject)?
A a 100% chance to win $60

B a 100% chance to lose $60

One (i.e., A) of the two options of this practice problem clearly dominates the
other one (i.e., B), and it was assumed that participants in the selection condition would
click on A, and those in the rejection condition would click on B if they understood the
task correctly and were paying enough attention. When participants clicked on the
intended option, they would see, “Please note: For all the following problems You need
to select the option you prefer (reject) [in red]!” Otherwise, they would see a warning
sign (see Figure 9), and the statement, “Please pay more attention! You need to select
the option you prefer (reject) [in red]!” Finally, after participants completed all 15
problems, they were asked “For the problems you have completed, what were you
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asked to do?” and provided the two options “To select an option” and “To reject an
option”. This test question was designed to check whether participants understood the
task frame correctly. After answering two demographic questions regarding their age
and gender, participants were given a random code that they could input into MTurk to
get paid.
Results
For the practice question, 5 out of 302 participants in the selection condition
answered it incorrectly by selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; a
higher portion, 48 out of 302 participants in the rejection condition chose to reject the
option with a 100% chance to win $60. These participants were notified about the task
frame again and were warned to pay more attention. Four participants in the selection
condition and two in the rejection condition answered the last test question incorrectly,
and they were excluded from the following analyses. The same RT cutoffs used in
Experiment 1 were used in this experiment for excluding the outlier trials (the fixed
reading-speed lower cutoff and the 500 ms upper cutoff excluded 16.0% and the M ± 3
SD cutoff excluded 1.6% of the total trials).
Choice Data
Figure 10 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 1014.37,
p < .001, R2 = .986, R2Adjusted = .972, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 767.76, p < .001,
R2 = .982, R2Adjusted = .964. The coefficients of the two regression functions were
significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.070, t(29) = 31.85, p < .001, and the
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rejection task, Beta = 0.930, t(29) = 27.71, p < .001. Although the difference between
the two coefficients was smaller, it was statistically significant, t(29) = 2.93, p = .005.
Decision Time
The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis.
There was a main effect task frame (Ms = 22.97 vs. 25.57 s for selection and rejection
tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 70.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .71, and a significant interaction
between task frame and feature order, F(1, 29) = 7.69, p = .010, ηp2 = .21. For positivenegative feature order, the mean RT was 23.13 for the selection task and 25.13 for the
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, the mean RT was 22.81 for both the
selection and 26.01 for the rejection task. The main effect of feature order was not
significant, F(1, 29) = 1.75, p = .197 , ηp2 = .06.
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EXPERIMENT 3B SONA PARTICIPANTS

Method
The purpose of this experiment was to test whether the difference between
Experiments 1 and 3A was due to the participant population or to the changes in the
survey design. The same experiment as in Experiment 3A was conducted on a total of
601 participants recruited through the Sona system. Participants in this experiment had
not participated in other similar experiments and were granted 1 research credit
towards the course requirements.
Results
The same data analysis procedure for Experiment 3A was used. For the practice
question, 4 out of 304 participants in the selection condition answered it incorrectly by
selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; 31 out of 299 participants in
the rejection condition chose to reject the option with a 100% chance to win $60. These
participants were notified about the task frame again and were warned to pay more
attention. Twelve participants in the seleciton condition and seven in the rejection
condition were excluded from subsequent analyses because they gave an incorrect
answer to the last test question. The fixed cutoffs excluded 10.8% and the M ± 3 SD
cutoff excluded 1.9% of the total trials.
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Choice Data
Figure 11 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 1054.46,
p < .001, R2 = .987, R2Adjusted = .973, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 515.28, p < .001,
R2 = .974, R2Adjusted = .947. The coefficients of the two regression functions were
significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.177, t(29) = 32.47, p < .001, and the
rejection task, Beta = 0.823, t(29) = 22.70, p < .001. More importantly, the difference
between the two coefficients was also significant, t(29) = 6.91, p < .001.
Decision Time
The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis.
None of the terms was significant: For the main effects of task frame and feature order,
Fs < 1, and for the interaction between the two factors, F(1, 29) = 2.00, p = .168, ηp2
= .06.
Discussion
The redesigned questionnaire used in Experiment 3 yielded a smaller task frame
effect than that in Experiment 1, yet the effect was still significant and conformed to
the accentuation account. Experiment 3 included clear task instructions emphasizing
the task frames, a practice question at beginning with feedback, and a test question at
the end for screening confused participants. These manipulations should have reduced,
if not eliminated, the possible confusion participants had on the task frame. In addition,
Experiment 3B was conducted on the same population and the same online platform
(Sona) as Experiment 1.
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Results in both Experiments 3A and 3B showed a task framing effect
qualitatively similar to the effect found in Experiment 1, in which participants were
more discriminating under the selection task frame than under the rejection one, again
supporting the accentuation account. Note that the task framing effect (i.e., the
difference between tasks) did become smaller in Experiment 3 than that in Experiment
1, indicating that task confusion likely was a contributor in the effect found in
Experiment 1, though it cannot be the whole story. These results indicate that the null
task framing effect in Experiment 2 was due to both reasons discussed earlier:
elimination of task confusion in the rejection task and need for verbalization of
reasons.
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EXPERIMENT 4. ONLINE ATTRACTIVENESS JUDGMENT TASK
Wedell (1997) used the overall proportion of the enriched option being
preferred as the index for the relative attractiveness of the enriched option, as did the
previous experiments in the current study. The purpose of Experiment 4 was to directly
obtain the attractiveness ratings of the options by requiring participants to rate the
likelihood that they would select (or reject) an option when only one option was
presented. Another purpose was to test whether the attractiveness judgment was
influenced by the framing of the question.
Method
Participants
A total of 300 participants were recruited through MTurk. The same screening
requirements for MTurk workers in Experiment 3 were used. The experiment took
about 9.5 minutes on average and the payment was $0.50. The same picture was used
to require that the participants had not participated in a similar study before.
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure
In the instruction, participants were told, “You will be presented with a number
of problems, for each of which you need to rate the likelihood that you will choose
(reject) [in red] a given option for that problem.” The ratings were done for each of the
two options in each problem, and each rating question only included one option, so
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there were in total 60 distinct rating questions. Each participant performed on 30
questions that were randomly selected from the total 60 questions. Participants were
told to take as much time as they need to complete all 30 questions, and the time to
complete each question was not recorded. In the positive condition, the question was
presented along with one option, and participants were asked, “How likely will you
choose [this option]?” on a 10-point scale (1 = very unlikely; 10 = very likely). In the
negative condition, participants were asked, “How likely will you choose [this
option]?” Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions. Similar to
Experiment 3, a practice question was presented to the participants at the beginning of
the experiment:
Imagine that you were to play a lottery. One lottery has a 100% chance
to win $60.
How likely will you choose (reject) to play this lottery?
It was expected that participants in the positive condition would give a rating
among 6 to 10 for the likelihood of choosing this lottery and participants in the
negative condition would give a rating among 1 to 5 for the likelihood of rejecting this
lottery. When they gave a rating within the expected range for this practice question,
participants saw a the message, “Please note: For all the following questions You need
to rate the likelihood that you will choose [in red] the option!”; otherwise, they saw the
warning sign shown in Figure 5 along with the statement, “Please pay more attention!
You need to rate the likelihood that you will choose (reject) [in red] the option!” Each
participant completed 30 questions randomly selected from all 60 questions.
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Results
One participant whose age was less than 18 years was excluded from the
subsequent analyses.
For the practice question (One lottery has a 100% chance to win $60), which
should have an obvious rating of attractiveness (high likelihood to choose to play this
lottery or low likelihood to reject to play this lottery). In the positive rating task, 98.1%
of the participants rated the likelihood to choose to play this lottery higher than or
equal to 6, 88.8% of whom rated it as 10; in the negative rating task, only 61.4% of the
participants rated the likelihood to reject to play this lottery lower than or equal to 5,
88.7% of whom rated it as 1; more importantly, 33.1% of the participants rated it as 10,
who clearly misunderstood the task (see Table 1). As to the final test question asking
what the task was, only three participants answered incorrectly and they were further
excluded from subsequent analyses.
The ratings in the negative condition were transformed by subtracting them
from 11 (= 11 − rating) to get the attractiveness rating used in the following analysis.
An ANOVA was used to test (see Carifio & Perla, 2007) the effects of task frame
(positive vs. negative), option type (enriched vs. impoverished), and feature order
(positive-negative vs. negative-positive) on the attractiveness ratings. The results
showed only a significant effect of enriched vs. impoverished option, and the enriched
options were rated less attractive than the impoverished options (Ms = 5.19 vs. 6.33).
No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.30.
The more important purpose of this experiment was to obtain the relative
attractiveness rating of the enriched option through direct rating. The mean rating for
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each option in each problem was computed across all valid participants in both the
positive and negative tasks given that the task frame term was not involved in any
significant effect in the above ANOVA analysis. The relative attractiveness was
calculated by the following formula:

0.5

,

where Attr stands for the relative attractiveness score, R stands for the mean rating.
Discussion
For the practice question, less than 10% of the participants in the positive rating
task were confused by or not paying attention to the task, yet nearly 40% of the
participants in the negative rating task seemed to fall in one or the other of these
categories. This discrepancy indicates that it is easier for people in the positive rating to
understand the task than people in the negative rating task, in line with the findings in
previous experiments that participants were more easily confused in the rejection task
than in the selection task. In addition, the results demonstrate the necessity of including
such practice questions in this type of study to help participants understand the task and
prevent misunderstanding, especially when the study is conducted online. The high
accuracy rates in the final test question for both positive and negative rating tasks
indicate that the warning feedback following the practice question was effective in
reminding people of the actual task requirement.
The task framing in this experiment did not have an influence on participants’
judgments. This result was not consistent with the compatibility account, which would

52
predict the enriched option to be rated as more attractive in the positive rating task than
in the negative rating task because people put more weights on the positive features in
the positive task and on the negative features in the negative task. As to predictions
from the accentuation account, on the one hand, it emphasizes accentuation of the
difference between options in the selection task. In the current judgment task, each
option was presented separately from the other one in the same problem, and thus no
accentuation of difference existed in the current setting.
On the other hand, the accentuation account proposes that the difference
between the two tasks is because different levels of commitment are involved in the
tasks. Ganzach (1995) compared the judgment and choice tasks, and claimed that
judgment task involves less commitment than choice task because “people have to live
with the outcome of their choices but not with the output of their judgments” (p. 114).
It is possible that the present found no difference in the positive and negative rating
tasks was due to there being not much commitment involved in either tasks. Thus, the
current results were at least not against the accentuation account.
The relative attractiveness index was then used to replace the overall proportion
of preferring the enriched option in the previous and later experiments, and similar
result patterns were obtained. The new regression plots are presented below the
original plots in the figures for each experiment (see Figures 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, and
13).
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EXPERIMENT 5. IN-LAB CHOICE TASK WITH EYE-TRACKING
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the information-processing
pattern through tracking eye movements while participants work on the problems under
the selection and rejection task frames. The compatibility account predicts that
participants will focus on the features that are more compatible with the task (i.e., focus
on positive features or the best values when selecting and on the negative features or
the worst values when rejecting), regardless of the overall relative attractiveness
difference between the enriched and impoverished options. In contrast, the
accentuation account predicts that participants will focus on the differences between
alternatives in selection tasks but not so much in rejection tasks. Thus, under this
assumption, participants will compare between the alternatives more in the selection
task, and there will be more eye-movement transitions between the alternatives on the
same features.
Given that the degree of accentuation is proposed to be based on the different
levels of commitment in the two tasks, the accentuation account also predicts that
people in the selection task will “pay more attention or be more willing to repeatedly
sample reasons” than in the rejection task due to greater need for justification in the
selection task.
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This experiment employed number of fixations and total time spent as measures
of amount of effort and information search, mean fixation duration as a measure of
processing depth, and relative ratio of different types of fixation transitions
(alternative-based vs. attribute-based) as a measure of information search pattern.
Method
Participants
A total of 49 participants (17 female, age 19.5 ± 1.2) from the same subject
pool as those in Experiments 1 and 2 were recruited from SONA. These participants
had not participated in previous experiments.
Apparatus and Stimuli
A Tobii X-60 (Tobii Technology AB, Danderyd, Sweden) eye tracker and the
iMotions Attention Tool 5.3 software (iMotions Inc., Cambridge, MA) were used to
record the eye movements of the participants during the experiments. The stimuli were
presented on a 23ʺ monitor that was connected with the eye tracker. The same
questionnaire used in Experiment 3 was used in this experiment, with some minor
wording modifications to fit each feature in one single line when presented on the
computer screen connected to the eye tracker.
Design and Procedure
Half of the participants performed the selection task, and the other half
performed the rejection task. The order of the 30 problems was randomly assigned for
each participant. In each problem, participants will be shown the problem statement (on
top) and two options (below the problem statement, side by side) simultaneously on the
screen. The position (left vs. right) of the enriched option relative to the impoverished
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option, and the order of the features within each option were treated as control
variables by being counterbalanced between-subjects within each task conditions.
Thus, for example, among the 24 participants who performed the selection task, 6
participants saw the enriched option to the left (or right) of the impoverished option
and the positive features above (or below) the negative features within each option.
Each attribute was defined as an area of interest (AOI). The AOIs were of the same
size, large enough to cover the longest feature of all problems, and were not
overlapped. Fixations on other areas were not considered for further analysis.
Results
One participant was excluded from the subsequent analyses due to the failure to
follow the instruction to look at the computer screen during the experiment.
Choice Data
The overall proportion preferring the enriched option explains a significant
amount of the variance in the proportion preferring the enriched option in both the
selection task (see Figure 12), F(1, 28) = 490.17, p < .001, R2 = .946, R2Adjusted = .944,
and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 216.48, p < .001, R2 = .885, R2Adjusted = .881. The
coefficients of the two regression functions were significant, for both the selection task,
Beta = 1.202, t(29) = 22.14, p < .001, and the rejection task, Beta = .798, t(29) = 14.71,
p < .001. More importantly, the difference between the two coefficients was
significant, t(29) = 5.25, p < .001.
Eye-Movement Data
The problem statement and each of the features were defined as AOIs (areas of
interest), and the following data for each AOI in each problem page were obtained by
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averaging across participants in each task condition: number of fixations (for fixaitons
equal to or longer than 100 ms), fixation duration (ms; the duration of each fixation),
time spent (ms; the sum of the durations of all fixations within the AOI), time spent
percent (%; the percent of the time spent out of the total time spent on the page).
The features within each option were then grouped into positive vs. negative
features by collapsing the positive features (2 or 3 out of 5 total features, or 1 out of 2
features) and the negative features (3 or 2 out of 5 totaol features, or 1 out of 2
features) for the following analyses. Each problem was treated as an experimental unit
in repeated-measure ANOVAs for time spent, time spent percent, number of fixaitons,
and fixation duration, with feature valence (positive vs. negative), option (enriched vs.
impoverished), and task (selection vs. rejection) as within-subject variables.
Number of fixations. The only significant effect was the main effect of the
option type, F(1, 29) = 4.34, p = .046, ηp2 = .13. There were more fixations on the
enriched option (M = 6.99) than on the impoverished option (M = 6.58). No other
effects were significant, ps ≥ .195. The means were 6.84 for the selection task and 6.73
for the rejection task. Although the data on the problem instructions were not included
in the current analysis, for the purpose of completeness, the number of fixations on the
problem instructions did not differ across the two tasks (Ms = 21.43 vs. 21.71), t(29) =
0.43, p = .672.
Average fixation duration. There was a significant main effect of option type,
F(1, 29) = 8.53, p = .007, ηp2 = .23, and an interaction between option type and task,
F(1, 29) = 12.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .30. The enriched option had longer average fixation
durations (M = 216 ms) than the impoverished option did (M = 212 ms). These
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differences were mainly due to the interaction that the enriched option had longer
fixation durations in the rejection task (Ms = 219 vs. 212 ms), but not in the selection
task (Ms = 212 vs. 211 ms). The selection task tended to have shorter average fixation
durations (M = 212 ms) compared to the rejection task (M = 215), F(1, 29) = 3.80, p
= .061, ηp2 = .12. No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.02. Again, no difference in
the average fixation durations on the problem instructions, (Ms = 204 vs. 207 ms), t(29)
= .65, p = .523. Note that although the difference in average fixation duration in the
current experiment was relatively small, there were previous studies that found
significant differences of similar size. For example, Rubaltelli et al. (2012) found a 9ms difference between a pricing task and an attractiveness rating task (M = 203 vs. 194
ms) and concluded “deeper and more deliberative processing” in the former task.
Time spent. This is a measure of how much participants spent on the features
in the options. The only significant effect was the main effect of the option type (Ms =
1552 and 1415 ms for enriched and impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 29) =
6.51 p = .016, ηp2 = .18. No other effects were significant, ps ≥ .168. The mean time
spent was 1458 in the selection condition and 1480 in the rejection condition. There
was no difference in time spent on the problem instruction in the two tasks (Ms = 4547
vs. 4607 ms), t(29) = .41, p = .688.
Percent of time spent. This is a measure of the ratio of the time spent on the
features to the time spent on the whole page. There was a significant main effect of
task (Ms = 6.34% vs. 6.17% for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) =
6.00, p = .021, ηp2 = .17. No other effects were significant, ps ≥ .101. There was no
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difference for the problem instructions (Ms = 17.66% vs. 18.42%), t (29) = 1.70, p
= .100.
Fixation transitions. An alternative-based transition was defined if a fixation
transition was made within the same alternative, and an attribute-based transition was
defined if the transition was made from one alternative to the other on the same
attribute. A repeated-measure ANOVA was conducted on the number of fixation
transitions with transition type (alternative-based vs. attribute-based) as a withinsubject variable and task frame (selection vs. rejection) as a between-subject variable.
There was only a main effect of transition type (Ms = 10.35 vs. 4.26 for alternativeand attribute-based transitions, respectively), F(1, 1436) = 1409.39, p < .001, ηp2 = .50.
No other effects were significant, Fs < 1. A similar result pattern was obtained when
computing the fixation transitions in the form of Payne index (Payne, 1976), which
equals to the ratio of the difference between the numbers of the alternative- and
attribute-based transitions and the sum of the two numbers.
Since there was no effect of the feature valence, the same analyses were
conducted by grouping all the features in each option altogether rather than grouping
them into the positive and negative two groups. Each problem was again treated as an
experimental unit in repeated-measure ANOVAs for time spent, time spent percent,
number of fixaitons, and fixation duration, with option (enriched vs. impoverished),
and task (selection vs. rejection) as within-subject variables.
Number of fixations. The only significant effect was the main effect of the
option type, F(1, 29) = 7.03, p = .013, ηp2 = .20. There were more fixations on the
enriched option (M = 29.44) than on the impoverished option (M = 27.01). No other
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effects were significant: For the main effect of task frame (Ms = 28.78 vs. 27.67), F(1,
29) = 2.71, p = .110, ηp2 = .09, and for the 2-way interaction, F(1, 29) = 3.61, p = .068,
ηp2 = .11. In the selection task, Ms = 29.70 vs. 27.87 for the enriched vs. impoverished
options, respectively; in the rejection task, Ms =29.19 vs. 26.16 for the enriched vs.
impoverished options, respectively.
Average fixation duration. There were significant main effects of task, F(1,
29) = 12.83, p = .001, ηp2 = .31, and option type, F(1, 29) = 11.67, p = .002, ηp2 = .29,
and an interaction between option type and task, F(1, 29) = 9.30, p = .005, ηp2 = .24.
The selection task had shorter average fixation duration (M = 211 ms) than the
rejection task (M = 217 ms). The enriched option had longer average fixation durations
(M = 216 ms) than the impoverished option did (M = 211 ms). These differences were
mainly due to the interaction that the enriched option had longer fixation durations in
the rejection task (Ms = 221 vs. 213 ms), but not in the selection task (Ms = 212 vs. 210
ms).
Time spent. This is a measure of how much participants spent on the features
in the options. There was a significant main effect of the option type (Ms = 6417 and
5789 ms for enriched and impoverished options, respectively), F(1, 29) = 10.53, p
= .003, ηp2 = .27, and a significant interaction between option type and task, F(1, 29) =
5.44, p = .027, ηp2 = .16. The difference between the two options was larger in the
rejection task (Ms = 6481 vs. 5698 ms for enriched and impoverished options,
respectively) than in the selection task (Ms = 6353 vs. 5878 ms). The main effect of
task was not significant, F(1, 29) = .03, p = .871, ηp2 = .00. The time spent was 6115
ms in the selection condition and 6089 ms in the rejection condition.
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Percent of time spent. There was a significant main effect of option type (Ms =
25.98% vs. 23.79%), F(1, 29) = 8.23, p = .007, ηp2 = .22. The main effect of task was
approaching the .05 significance level (Ms = 25.10% vs. 24.67% for selection and
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 3.53, p = .071, ηp2 = .11. The interaction
between the two factors was not significant, F(1, 29) = 2.84, p = .103, ηp2 = .09.
Discussion
The choice data showed that participants in the selection condition were more
discriminating than those in the rejection condition, again supporting the accentuation
account. This result pattern was consistent with the previous experiments, except
Experiment 2 (verbal protocols). Note that participants in this experiment were well
aware of the tasks because of the first practice question and reminders from the
experimenter. This different pattern from Experiment 2 provides evidence that the
overlapping of the two regression lines in Experiment 2 was due to the need of
justification for the choice.
The eye-movement data did not show as rich patterns regarding the task frame
as expected, however, there were some interesting results worth mentioning. The
average fixation duration, which is a measure for cognitive effort, was longer in the
rejection than in the selection task. Participants in the rejection task spent more effort
on the options than those in the selection task. In addition, although time spent did not
show a difference between the two tasks, the analysis on time spent percent showed a
tendency for a higher percent in the selection than in the rejection task. These results
indicate that although participants spent roughly the same amount of the time on the
options, those in the rejection task spent more time on other information other than the

61
options. These differences imply the same speculation as in previous question that the
rejection task may require more cognitive effort and cause more confusion.
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EXPERIMENT 6. ONLINE CHOICE TASK WITH TIME PRESSURE
The accentuation account proposes that the difference between the alternatives
is accentuated more in the selection task than in the rejection task. Is this accentuation
an automatic process or a deliberative process? Is the accentuation process fast enough
not to be influenced by time pressure? Under time pressure, people tend to rely more
on automatic processes and reduce analytic processes (e.g., Finucane et al., 2000). If
the accentuation of alternative difference is deliberative, then the task framing effect
should be reduced under time pressure; if the accentuation is automatic and fast, then
the task framing effect should remain the same under time pressure. The purpose of
this experiment was to investigate how time pressure affects the role of task frame, and
thus understand the nature of the accentuation process.
Method
Participants
A total of 606 participants were recruited from MTurk using the same
procedure as in Experiment 3.
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure
The same questionnaire used in Experiment 3 was used, but with time
constraints. The mean and standard deviation for the time to submit each problem in
each of the selection and rejection tasks in Experiment 3 were obtained and used to
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compute the time limit for each problem. The time allowed for answering each problem
was one standard deviation below the mean, which has been commonly used in
previous studies (e.g., Huber & Kunz, 2007). For each problem, the time remaining
was indicated by a countdown timer at the bottom of the screen.
Results
For the practice question, 5 out of 306 participants in the selection condition
answered it incorrectly by selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; 32
out of 300 participants in the rejection condition chose to reject the option with a 100%
chance to win $60. These participants were notified about the task frame again and
were warned to pay more attention. Two participants in the selection condition and
seven in the rejection condition answered the last test question incorrectly, and they
were excluded from the following analyses. Only the fixed reading time lower cutoff
was used to exclude outlier trials. The 500 ms upper cutoff and the M ± 3 SD cutoff
were not used because the predetermined time limit used for each problem served as an
upper cutoff. For two problems (#14 and 27), the computed time limits were shorter
than the least reading times in the selection condition, and these two problems were
eliminated from subsequent analyses. The reading time cutoff excluded 33% of the
total trials for the rest 28 problems.
Figure 13 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 470.46,
p < .001, R2 = .948, R2Adjusted = .946, and the rejection task, F(1, 28) = 288.81, p < .001,
R2 = .917, R2Adjusted = .914. The coefficients of the two regression functions were
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significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.122, t(29) = 21.69, p < .001, and the
rejection task, Beta = 0.878, t(29) = 17.00, p < .001. The difference between the two
coefficients was significant, t(29) = 3.33, p = .002, and this difference did not differ
from the corresponding difference in Experiment 3A, t (108) = 1.22, p = .226.
Decision Time
The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis.
There was a main effect of task frame (Ms = 12.08 vs. 12.71 s for selection and
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 27) = 9.82, p = .004, ηp2 = .27, and a main effect of
feature order (Ms = 12.36 vs. 12.42 s for positive-negative and negative-positive
orders, respectively), F(1, 27) = 4.76, p = .038, ηp2 = .15. The interaction between task
frame and feature order was not significant, F(1, 27) = 3.32, p = .080, ηp2 = .11.
Discussion
The average decision time was 12.4 s, which was approximately half of the
average time in the previous three online experiments (26.5 s in Experiment 1 with
Sona participants, 24.3 s in Experiment 3A with MTurk participants, and 26.9 s in
Experiment 3B with Sona participants). One of the MTurk workers sent an email to me
stating that the task was “stressful but interesting”. Although this experiment did not
directly measure participants’ perception of the time pressure, the time pressure
manipulation seems to be successful.
Under time pressure, the same task framing effect explained by the accentuation
account was found, of similar size as in previous experiments. That the time pressure
did not influence the task framing effect indicates that the accentuation process seems
to be relatively automatic. This would also explain why the verbal protocols method in
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Experiment 2 eliminated the task framing effect: the requirement for verbalization of
reasons promoted more deliberative thinking, which may have overridden the
automatic processes of accentuating the difference between alternatives more in the
selection task, and thus led to the null task framing effect.
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EXPERIMENT 7. ONLINE CHOICE TASK “ANTI” TIME PRESSURE
Although it is convenient and efficient in data collection, one problem with
collecting data on MTurk is that the workers may work through the problems as fast as
they can by default so that they can move on to the next HIT posted by other people.
This default status may have imposed implicit time pressure on the workers, which
may be a problem for many other online platforms too. In Experiments 3A and 6, By
excluding the answers that were given in a very short time (e.g., the time needed to
read only the two options in each problem at the fast average reading speed), I have
tried to solve this issue implicit time pressure in data analyses. The purpose of the
current experiment was to provide a solution while participants performed the tasks, by
forcing a “waiting time” for each problem. Participants had to wait a certain amount of
time before they could click on the “next” button to submit their answers.
Method
Participants
A total of 600 participants were recruited from MTurk using the same
procedure as in Experiment 3.
Apparatus, Stimuli, Design, and Procedure
The same questionnaire used in Experiment 3 was used, but with different time
constraints. Unlike in Experiment 6, participants were encouraged to take as much time
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as they need, and they had to wait a certain amount of time (i.e., the mean for the time
to submit each problem in each task in Experiment 3) before they could respond to
each problem. Each problem was presented for the designated wait time without a
“next” button, on which only by clicking were participants able to proceed. After this
predetermined time window, the “next” button showed up at the right bottom of the
page, and then participants could respond immediately or wait longer to respond.
Results
For the practice question, 1 out of 300 participants in the selection condition
answered it incorrectly by selecting the gamble that had a 100% chance to lose $60; 41
out of 300 participants in the rejection condition chose to reject the option with a 100%
chance to win $60. These participants were notified about the task frame again and
were warned to pay more attention. Three participants in the selection condition and
three in the rejection condition answered the last test question incorrectly, and they
were excluded from the following analyses. The same cutoffs for response time as
those in Experiment 3 were used. The fixed cutoff and the M + 3 SD cutoff excluded
0.04% trials in total.
Figure 14 shows the regression lines of the two tasks. The overall proportion
preferring the enriched option explains a significant amount of the variance in the
proportion preferring the enriched option in both the selection task, F(1, 28) = 1315.12,
p < .001, R2 = .979, R2Adjusted = .978, and the rejection task, F(1, 2) = 860.76, p < .001,
R2 = .968, R2Adjusted = .967. The coefficients of the two regression functions were
significant, for both the selection task, Beta = 1.106, t(29) = 36.27, p < .001, and the
rejection task, Beta = 0.894, t(29) = 29.34, p < .001. The difference between the two
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coefficients was significant, t(29) = 4.91, p < .001, and this difference did not differ
from the corresponding difference in Experiment 3A, t(112) = 1.13, p = 0.263, or
Experiment 6, t(108) = 0.38, p = .702.
Decision Time
The mean time to complete each problem was used for the timing analysis.
There was a main effect of task frame (Ms =29.02 vs. 32.63 s for selection and
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 118.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .80, and a main effect
of feature order (Ms = 30.42 vs. 31.23 s for positive-negative and negative-positive
orders, respectively), F(1, 29) = 28.66, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. The interaction between task
frame and feature order was not significant, F(1, 29) = 0.01, p = .945, ηp2 = .00.
Discussion
The mean decision time in this experiment (30.8 s) was longer than the mean in
Experiment 3A (24.3 s) which was also conducted on the MTurk workers but with no
specific time constraints. This difference is understandable because the forced waiting
time in the present experiment was defined by the mean decision time in Experiment
3A in each problem. More interestingly, the regression lines for the choice data showed
a very similar pattern in both experiments, which did not differ from the time pressure
condition in Experiment 6 with a mean decision time of 12.4 s. Thus, the similar
patterns in task framing effect revealed in Experiments 3A and 6 were not due to the
implicit time pressure the MTurk workers may have in Experiment 3A. The results
from this experiment validate the finding in Experiment 6 that the accentuation process
is relatively automatic and is not affected by time pressure.
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This finding should be welcomed by researchers who collect data on MTurk,
yet a caution should be placed for collecting data on MTurk and other online platforms.
Note that in Experiment 3A the reading-speed cutoff excluded approximately 16% of
the total data, which indicates that at some participants were “rushing through” on
some problems. With justifiable cutoff methods of excluding outliers, the data obtained
with no time constraints could be taken as being as valid as when the waiting time was
imposed on the participants. However, the loss of data due to the exclusion of outliers
can be made up by running more people, given the efficiency of data collection on
these platforms.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The seven experiments, conducted in laboratory and online, used a variety of
methods to examine how different task frames change the decision maker’s preference.
The predictions from the compatibility account and the accentuation account were
tested. The compatibility account (Shafir, 1993) predicts the enriched option to be
preferred more often under the selection task frame than under the rejection task frame,
due to the reason that the more positive (negative) features in the enriched option are
more compatible with and are thus weighted more the selection (rejection) task. The
accentuation account (Wedell, 1997) predicts the more attractive option to be preferred
more and the less attractive option to be preferred less in the selection task than in the
rejection task, due to the rationale that people are more discriminating in the selection
task with a higher level of commitment involved than in the rejection task. The results
in all but one experiment fit with the prediction from the accentuation account.
Experiment 1 was conducted online on introductory psychology class students,
with a plain statement for the task (either a selection or a rejection one), and a large
difference between the two task frames (the task framing effect) was found as predicted
by the accentuation account. In Experiment 2, participants were recruited from the
same subject pool but were required to verbalize their thoughts while performing the
same tasks in a laboratory. No difference between the two task frames in the choice
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data was found in this experiment, possibly due to the need for verbalization of reasons
in Experiment 2 or the confusion about the rejection task in Experiment 1. With a
modified version of the questionnaire conducted on both MTurk workers (Experiment
3A) and introductory psychology students (Experiment 3B), Experiment 3 emphasized
the tasks in several different ways to reduce the possible confusion regarding the task,
and a similar pattern as in Experiment 1 was evident though with a smaller effect size.
Thus, it was established that task confusion cannot explain the task framing effect
alone.
Experiment 4 used a judgment task, in which participants were required to rate
the likelihood of selecting or rejecting an option. It was again found that more
participants in the negative task did not understand the task correctly before any
feedback was provided. The ratings from this experiment were used as direct
attractiveness measures and a similar task framing effect was found with these
measures. The finding of task framing effect was supported by the data from an eyetracking experiment (Experiment 5), in which participants were invited to the lab
performing the tasks without being required to verbalize their thoughts. In the last two
experiments, whether the task framing effect was influenced by time pressure was
tested. Experiment 6 imposed time limits on participants and required them to respond
within a short time, whereas Experiment 7 forced participants to wait a certain amount
of time before they could respond. Both experiments found a task framing effect that
did not differ from that in Experiment 3A, which indicates that this task framing effect
was relatively automatic and that it did not extra take time for people being more
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task.
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Positive Versus Negative Tasks
In the current choice tasks of Experiments 3A, 3B, 6, and 7, participants were
first shown a practice question after the instructions. There was an obviously desirable
option (i.e., a 100% chance to win $60) and an undesirable one (i.e., a 100% chance to
lose $60) in the practice question. The logic was that if participants were paying
attention and understood the task accurately, they would select the desirable option or
rejection the undesirable one. A consistent finding was that more participants in the
rejection task (M = 12.7% across experiments) answered the practice question
incorrectly than those in the selection task (M = 1.2%). In Experiment 2 with the verbal
protocols, 12 of the 20 participants in the rejection task took the task as a selection one
without the experimenter’s reminder, but none in the selection task mistook the task.
Similarly in the judgment task of Experiment 4, participants were to rate their
likelihood of choosing or rejecting a highly desirable lottery with a 100% chance to
win $60. Consistent with the pattern in the choice tasks, more participants in the
negative rating task (38.7%) showed task confusion or inattention than those in the
positive rating task (1.9%).
There are several possible reasons for the difference between the two task
frames. It is possible that some participants were not paying attention to what they
were doing when performing a task online. These participants may have taken it for
granted that the task was a positive one of selection or rating the likelihood of selection,
because most online experiments they have encountered should involve a positive task.
The same is true for most daily life problems, a simple example of which is that people
typically purchase more than they return. In the worst case, some participants may
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click on an option randomly because the questions were supposed to reflect personal
preferences. In the latter, the number of “random” participants should not differ under
the two task frames because the problem was not elicited by the task per se, and thus
the number should be very small because only less than 2% of the participants in the
positive tasks did so.
In a study by Chen, Gates, Li, and Proctor (2015), participants were required to
make a hypothetic decision on whether to install a mobile app. Along with other
information such as user ratings, a risk or safety score in the form of filled circles was
presented on for each app. Chen et al. found that this risk or safety score influenced
participants’ decision making that the higher (lower) the safety (risk) score, the more
often the app was selected. Moreover, the safety score had a larger effect (i.e., people
were more discriminating) than the risk score, similar to the comparison between the
selection and rejection tasks in the current study. Chen et al. included a final test
question to examine participants’ understanding of the risk or safety symbols, and
found that more people in the risk condition answered the test question incorrectly than
in the safety condition. A follow-up analysis was conducted on the participants who
identified the symbols correctly, and the difference between the safety and risk frames
(i.e., the advantage for presenting a safety score) tended to be smaller but still
significant. Although framing in Chen et al.’s study was not in terms of the task but the
information, the result pattern similar to the current study indicates that a negative way
of presenting the information in terms of risk could have led to more confusion than a
positive way of presenting the information in terms of safety.
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Another possible reason is that the greater task confusion in the negative task
was due to its requiring more effort to understand than the positive task. With limited
time and effort people may attribute to a task, the more difficult the task the more
likely errors will occur. Moreover, the current data in Experiments (1, 3A, 3B, 6, and 7)
showed that participants tended to spent more time under the rejection task frame than
under the selection frame. In the eye-tracking experiment (Experiment 5), although the
total time to complete each problem did not differ under the two task frames, the
average fixation duration (a measure of cognitive effort) was longer in the rejection
task than in the selection task. These data indicate that the rejection task may be more
effortful and occupy more cognitive resources.
Improvement of the Accentuation Account
Accentuation of Difference?
The accentuation account proposes that the reason why participants are more
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task is because the difference
between attributes being accentuated more in the selection task, which involves a
higher level commitment. As stated by Wedell (1997), “The accentuation hypothesis
simply argues that greater commitment or need for justification in choice leads to
greater weighting of attribute differences. In other words, people are more
discriminating when choosing than when rejecting” (p. 874).
The current study showed the result pattern that is predicted by the accentuation
account in the sense that participants were more discriminating in the selection task
than in the rejection task. However, regarding the accentuation process, I argue that
people have to process the features before knowing the difference, so that there is a
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leap to assume that the task frame actually influences how people weight the difference
rather than to assume what is influenced is a process on the features per se. Thus, I
propose that a more direct explanation is that people evaluate the positive features
being more positive and/or the negative ones being more negative in the selection task,
which yield to a greater discrimination in the selection than in the rejection task. This
new way of looking at the accentuation process also makes it possible to extend the
accentuation account to explain results from judgment tasks on each option
individually, in which the difference between the options is not available within one
problem.
Difference in Discrimination
Regarding the reason why people are more discriminating under the selection
task frame than under the rejection task frame, I propose that available cognitive
resource is a possible critical factor. The current experiments did not test directly the
levels of commitment involved in the two tasks, neither did the previous studies by
Ganzach (1995) or Wedell (1997). The assumption that the selection task involves
more commitment than the rejection task was from the speculation that people need to
live with the option they make in the selection task but not the one in the rejection task
(Ganzach, 1995). Meloy and Russo (2004) tested the commitment level in both a
selection and rejection tasks, using a subjective certainty rating as a measure, and
found that the commitment level was not higher in the selection task than in the
rejection task. Based on the current data, participants were more confused about the
rejection task (Experiments 2, 3, 6, and 7), spent more time in the rejection task than in
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the selection task (Experiments 1, 3, 6, and 7), or had a longer average fixation
duration in the rejection task than in the selection task (Experiment 5).
Consequently, it is reasonable to think that people in the rejection task have to
spend part of their cognitive resource in understanding the task per se and thus less
resource is available for the decisions to make. In the rejection task, if people have to
put some effort into understanding the task itself, then they may not have as many
resources to devote to the choice as people in the selection task. As a result, people in
the rejection task are not as discriminating as those in the selection task. Thus, it is
possible that people are more discriminating in the selection task because more
available cognitive resources are available for discriminating between the options than
in the rejection task, though the influence of different levels of commitment cannot be
excluded without further empirical evidence.
Modified Accentuation Account
Based on the above evaluation, I propose a modified version of the accentuation
account according to the above analyses. The selection versus rejection task frame has
an influence on people’s preferences, based on two assumptions: 1) People under the
rejection task frame need to spend part of their cognitive resources to understanding the
task, and thus have less cognitive resource available to discriminate the alternatives. 2)
Compared to those under the rejection task frame, people under the selection task are
more discriminating, the positive features appear to be more positive and the negative
features to be more negative, and thus the more (less) attractive alternative becomes
even more (less) attractive. In addition, because the task framing effect was not
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influenced by the time-pressure manipulation, the accentuation process seems to be
relatively automatic.
Accounting for Previous Results
In this section, I discuss the applicability of this modified accentuation account
in explaining some of the earlier studies in support of the compatibility account. The
same logic that the difference under various task frames lies in the amount of available
cognitive resource can be applied to the choice and matching tasks in Tversky et al.’s
(1988) study, mentioned in Introduction. For a choice task, the participants only need
to come up with one of the two alternatives, whereas for a matching task a specific
number is required. The latter task seems to be more demanding, as the rejection task
in the selection vs. rejection task pair. So when the participants were told that the
technical-knowledge attribute was more important, they were better at cooperating this
information into their decisions in the choice task than in the matching task because
there is more available cognitive resource in the simpler choice task. This rationale can
explain why 65% of the participants in the choice task indicated preference for the
candidate with a higher technical-knowledge score whereas only 34% participants in
the matching task did so. Note that this study cannot distinguish whether being more
discriminating in one task than the other is due to the former task involving more
commitment or being less effortful, because the choice task is less effortful than the
matching task and also possibly involves more commitment because people need to
live with the option they choose.
In Nowlis and Simonson’s (1997) study, each of the two options in the
problems contained one “comparable” feature and one “enriched” feature, and the
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comparable feature is easier to compare than the enriched feature. In their example
problem with two alternative televisions, TV A had a low-quality brand (Magnavox)
but low price ($209), and TV B had a high-quality brand (Sony) but high price ($309).
The authors proposed that brand is an enriched feature and price is a comparable
feature, which are compatible with a rating task and a choice task, respectively. The
finding was that participants preferred the options with better brands like TV B more in
the rating task than in the choice task. Using an average of the percentages that one
option was preferred in both tasks, I obtained the relative attractiveness of this option.
In all seven of Nowlis and Simonson’s similar experiments, the options like TV B were
more attractive (M = 56%) than the other options. In other words, participants were
more discriminating (i.e., preferring the more attractive option like TV B more) in the
rating task than in the choice task. According to the commitment explanation in the
accentuation account proposed by Wedell (1997), higher level commitment should be
involved in the choice task than in the rating task because people will need to live with
the option they chosen but not the options they made a judgment through rating
(Ganzach, 1995). In this way, the accentuation account is not able to account for the
results from Nowlis and Simonson’s study. However, one can assume that the rating
task is less effortful than the choice task because the rating task involve only one
option and the choice task requires an evaluation of both options. With this assumption
proposed in the modified accentuation account, people have more cognitive resources
available in the rating task to evaluate the features of an option, and thus become more
discriminating, explaining the results.
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The cognitive-resource view is also consistent with the compatibility account in
some circumstances. For example, Slovic et al. (1990) found that when providing both
market value and rank in market value of companies, participants weighted one of the
two types of information (e.g., rank) more if they were required to predict the
companies’ performance for the next year in that type of information (e.g., rank). To
explain this result in terms of the modified accentuation account, the effort demands for
the two tasks need to be dependable on both the task and the information used. It is
easier and less effortful to use the same type of information when making the
prediction (e.g., to make a prediction on the rank when the ranks are available), which
is also consistent with the compatibility principle.
The Compatibility Account
One possibility why the current study did not obtain a result pattern that fit with
the compatibility account proposed by Shafir (1993) is that the compatibility effect
becomes evident only in certain circumstances. As stated by Shafir, “Naturally,
compatibility effects tend to be mild, and limited in their ability to influence decision”
(p. 547). The compatibility account explains decision-making processes best when the
alternatives are otherwise comparable and the decision is difficult. When the
alternatives are clearly different in terms of attractiveness to the decision maker,
slightly different weightings of the positive and negative features should not affect the
final choice. Similar to this idea, in Meloy and Russo’s (2004) experiments that
supported the compatibility account, the alternatives in each problem were controlled
to be relatively equal in terms of attractiveness. Thus, the compatibility account may
explain better for the problems with the options of similar attractiveness, and it may not
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be able to explain the results considering a broad range of relative attractiveness of the
alternatives.
To test this possibility, I checked my data using the way Shafir (1993) analyzed
his data, by comparing 100% with the sum of the percentage of the enriched option
being selected (PS) and that of it being rejected (PR). A compatibility effect exists if the
sum (PS + PR) is significantly greater than 100%, because according to the
compatibility account the enriched option is preferred more in the selection task than in
the rejection task (PS > 1 − PR). For each experiment (except Experiment 4), I ranked
the problems by the relative attractiveness of the enriched option, and took the middle
third of the problems to compare average of the sum (PS + PR) for the problems with
those from the first and the last thirds of the problems. In none of the experiments was
the average sum of the middle third higher than the numbers for the first and last thirds
of the problems. Averaging across all experiments, the average sum was 94, 98, and
104 for the first, middle, and last thirds of the problems, respectively. Thus, it seems
that whether the two options were similar in terms of attractiveness did not affect the
evidence of the compatibility effect in the current study.
Compatibility From a Different Perspective
The compatibility in Shafir’s (1993) account lies between the feature valence
(positive vs. negative) and the task frame (selection vs. rejection). This compatibility
relation requires the features within an option to be processed individually and interact
with the task frame. Another way of looking at the compatibility relation is to treat
each option as a unit, whose valence interacts with the task frame. These two layers of
compatibility relation are similar to the element-level and set-level compatibility in the

81
stimulus-response compatibility studies (e.g., Proctor & Wang, 1997). In this sense of
option-based compatibility (compared with the previously defined feature-based
compatibility), a more attractive option is more compatible with the selection task, and
a less attractive option is more compatible with the rejection task. As a result, this
option-based compatibility relation predicts that the more attractive options are
preferred more in the selection task than in the rejection task, and the less attractive
options are preferred more in the rejection task than in the selection task. This
prediction fits exactly the data pattern found in the current study and that in Wedell’s
(1997) study.
This option-based compatibility account and the accentuation account are not
mutually exclusive. It can be that the stimulus element that is more compatible with the
task is weighted more heavily under this specific task than under other tasks, though
these different weighting effects may not be evident when the options are very
distinguishable in other aspects. In the meanwhile, some tasks are less effortful than
others (e.g., selection task compared to rejection task, choice task compared to
matching task) and people have additional available cognitive resources to focus on the
decision per se in these less effortful tasks than in others.
Use of Verbal Protocols
In the current study, the verbal-protocol experiment (Experiment 2)
demonstrated unique result patterns different from all other experiments. First, looking
at the choice data, it was the only experiment in which the task framing effect was not
evident. The regression lines for the selection and rejection tasks almost overlapped
with each other, indicating that participants had similar preference patterns under both
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task frames. The principle of procedure invariance held in this experiment and the
participants seemed to be “rational” according to the rational decision making theories.
Second, in the verbal protocol data, participants tended to follow the compatibility
principle by mentioning the features that are compatible with the task (e.g., positive
features in the selection task). The above mentioned result patterns only occurred in
Experiment 2, not in other experiments even when the task frame was emphasized and
tested in the online experiments or when the participants were reminded about the task
and monitored by the experimenter in the laboratory setting (Experiment 5). Thus,
these patterns are apparently attributable to the task requirement that participants report
their thoughts verbally while performing the tasks.
Caution should be taken when using the processing-tracing methods such as the
verbal protocols and information board (e.g., Mouselab, Bettman, et al., 1990) Verbal
protocol methods have been shown to influence the decision-making process rather
than just revealing the process (e.g., Dickson, McLennan, & Omodei, 2000). Glöckner
and Betsch (2008) compared results obtained using Mouselab with results obtained
when the information was not restricted to participants, and found that using Mouselab
introduced limitations in information search and more use of simple, noncompensatory strategies. The current study also showed that people became more
“rational” and relied more on deliberative processing when required to verbalize their
thoughts during the experiment. In addition, the need for verbalization of reasons may
have promoted the reason-based processing, which is consistent with the compatibility
account.

83
It was, however, beneficial to conduct an experiment with the verbal protocols method,
which revealed interesting phenomena that would otherwise difficult to find out.
Because participants were required to speak out their thoughts, I was able to discover
that more than half of the participants in the rejection task thought the task was a
selection one at the beginning. Another finding is that although the features in each
option were predetermined to have positive, negative, or average values, these values
could be very different for different participants. As an example, for a problem of
selecting/rejecting one of two pairs of shoes, some participants thought “it appears as if
everyone has a pair” was a good feature for shoes because it means the pair of shoes is
popular for a good reason, but other said it was not good because they did not want to
wear the same shoes as everyone else does.
Lessons for Conducting Experiments Online
The current study utilized both online and laboratory experiments: The online
experiments provided choice and other response data of larger sample sizes, and the
laboratory experiments obtained process-tracing data and other observations that are
not available through online experiments. Conducting experiments online has become a
complementary way of collecting data in laboratories. It usually works in the situations
where the instructions are simple enough for participants to follow, the task does not
require strict control (e.g., sound proofing), or no physical data (e.g., biometric
measures) to be collected, and the required experimental population is able to and has
access to internet and computer. Online experiments work better when time, budget, or
human resource is limited, and a large number of participants is needed, the
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experiments need to be conducted in multiple locations, or the experiment is related to
online contents (e.g., webpage design).
Besides the traditional university subject pool (e.g., the Sona system used in the
current study), MTurk has become an increasingly popular platform for data collection
in the areas of psychology and other social sciences in the past ten years (Paolacci,
Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). It has been concluded that MTurk is a viable alternative
for data collection, the recruited population is relatively representative of the U.S.
population, and the workers pay at least as much attention as participants from other
platforms (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Paolacci et al., 2010).
To ensure that the MTurk participants did not just rush through the task without
paying attention or with an implicit time pressure to respond fast, I included an
experiment in which the participants were forced to wait a certain amount of time
(mean RT in an earlier experiment) before they were able to respond. A comparison
between this experiment and a “usual” one without any timing manipulation would tell
how the participants were doing in the usual experiments. It turned out that participants
in both experiments used roughly similar amounts of time to finish the task and
demonstrated similar result patterns. In addition, there were answers which were given
only in a couple of seconds in the online experiments, which meant the participants did
not even finish reading (part of) the contents before they responded. This type of fast
response may be due to the participants not paying attention or just clicking on the
“next” button mistakenly. In the analyses of all my online experiments, I included an
RT cutoff to exclude this type of outliers to get cleaner data. In addition, a practice
question with clear right or wrong answers was presented at the beginning of the online
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experiments to help participants understand the task. I would argue that these types of
manipulation and comparison are necessary in conducting online experiments,
especially when a timing manipulation is involved. Inserting several questions similar
to the practice question throughout the experiment will also help to screen out
participants who do not understand the task or do not follow the instructions.
Directions for Future Research
Wedell’s (1997) accentuation account proposes that “greater commitment or
need for justification in choice” (p. 874) leads to more accentuation in the selection
task than in the rejection task. My modified version of the accentuation account
proposes that available cognitive resources may be a critical factor that yields the
difference between the two tasks. Neither Wedell’s study or the current study measured
level of commitment or need for justification directly in the tasks, and my inference
that the rejection task is more effortful than the selection task is based on the
performance data in the practice questions, the decision-time data, and the eye-tracking
data. A possible direction for future studies is to measure directly the level of
commitment or need for justification for the different tasks, and how effortful the tasks
are.
The current study employed an information-processing approach to understand
how people make decisions under different task frames. A pattern informed by the
modified version of the accentuation account is that people evaluate the positive
features to be more positive and the negative ones more negative. One question the
current study did not answer directly is: What are the decision-making strategies
people use when performing the tasks? Future studies can test the possible strategies
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(e.g., compensatory vs. non-compensatory strategies; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996;
Sütterlin, Brunner, & Opwis, 2008) people use, especially whether people use different
strategies under different task frames and under different time-constrained situations.
The task framing effect studied in this dissertation can be applied to a number
of tasks other than the daily-life problems used in the current experiments (e.g., to
select a school to attend; to decide which product to return). For example, in the
cybersecurity field, people usually need to perform certain tasks to permit or deny the
use of their personal data depending on the default privacy setting (e.g., Lai & Hui,
2006), and people using smart devices often need to install or uninstall an application
given various features of an application (e.g., Chen et al., 2014). Future studies can
focus on investigating how different task frames influence people’s decision making in
these specific situations, and how to maintain better privacy and security in the cyber
world by manipulating different task frames.
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CONCLUSION
The current study provided evidence for the task framing effect that the
selection versus rejection task frames influence the decision makers’ preferences.
People preferred the more (less) attractive option more (less) in the selection task than
in the rejection, and this task framing effect was not influenced by time pressure. This
result pattern supports the accentuation account (Wedell, 1997) that people are more
discriminating in the selection task than in the rejection task.
In terms of theoretical contribution, I proposed a modified version of the
accentuation account: Compared to those under the selection task frame, people under
the rejection task frame have less cognitive resources available for discriminating the
alternatives; the accentuation process makes evaluation of the positive (negative)
features more positive (negative), and it seems to be automatic. I also discussed the
implications of the current finding for the compatibility account. An option-level
compatibility account rather than the feature-level compatibility account is consistent
with the current finding, and previous studies supporting the compatibility account
could possibly be explained in terms of the modified accentuation account.
In terms of methodological contribution, this study demonstrated a case of
combining and comparing data from online and laboratory experiments, by collecting
large-sample data online and obtaining information-processing patterns in the
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laboratory. In addition, I provided recommendations for conducting experiments
involving different task frames online to make sure and/or examine whether
participants understand the task frame as intended by the experimenter: To include a
practice question with proper feedback at the beginning and a test question regarding
the task frame at the end of the experiment.
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Rating
Percent
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Rating
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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The Frequency and Percent of Ratings in the Positive and Negative Rating Tasks for the Practice Question
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Figure 1. Th
he left panell shows that in Shafir’s ((1993) data tthe enriched option was
preferred more often in the selection
n task than inn the rejectioon task; the middle paneel
i Ganzach’ss (1995) dataa the enricheed option waas preferred less often inn the
shows that in
selection tassk than in the rejection taask; the righht panel show
ws that the combined datta of
the previouss study demo
onstrates thee effect of rellative attracttiveness of tthe enriched
option. Figu
ure 1 from Wedell
W
(1997
7).
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ns predicted by
b the comppatibility acccount (left paanel), the
Figure 2. Reesult pattern
accentuation
n account (m
middle panel)), and the prrinciple of prrocedural invvariance (rigght
panel).
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Figure 3. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom
panel) for Sona participants in Experiment 1.
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Figure 4. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom
panel) for verbal-protocol participants in Experiment 2.
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Figure 10. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom
panel) for MTurk participants in Experiment 3.
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Figure 11. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom
panel) for SONA participants in Experiment 3.
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Figure 12. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom
panel) for eye-tracking participants in Experiment 5.
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Figure 13. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom
panel) for MTurk participants under time pressure in Experiment 6.
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Figure 14. The proportions of the enriched option being preferred in selection and
rejection tasks as a function of the overall proportion preferring the enriched option
(top panel) and of the relative attractiveness rating of the enriched option (bottom
panel) for MTurk participants with waiting time in Experiment 7.
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Appendix C

Materials Used in the Experiments
The first 26 problems were taken from Wedell (1997). The last four problems were
created similar to the gamble problems used in Shafir (1993).
Stimulus
Option Type

Description

Topic
Parent A has an above-average income, a very close
relationship with the child, an extremely active
Enriched
social life, lots of work related travel, and minor
Child

health problems.

Custody
Parent B has an average income, average health,
Impoverished

average working hours, a reasonable rapport with the
child, and a relatively stable social life.
Spot A has lots of sunshine, gorgeous beaches and

Enriched

coral reefs, an ultra modern hotel, cold water, and
limited nightlife.

Vacation
Spot B has average weather, average beaches, a
Impoverished

medium-quality hotel, medium-temperature water,
and an average nightlife.
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Candidate A served honorably as the vice president
of the council last term. He organized a fund raiser
to support the local children's hospital. He was voted
Enriched
"Most Intelligent" in high school. He enrolled as an
art student in college, but dropped out. He has been
divorced once.

Election

Candidate B enjoys camping and other outdoor
activities. He is a local business man. In high school,
Impoverished

he was voted "most enthusiastic." He majored in
history in college. He has two children enrolled in
the local elementary school.
Professor A is very enthusiastic and really gets
excited about the course, is often very humorous, has

Enriched
you write two papers a week, is a hard grader but
gives lots of useful feedback.

Course

Professor B is fairly interesting, speaks clearly,
Impoverished

requires that you write one paper a week, and
provides reasonable feedback.
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Company A has a high starting salary, full health
insurance coverage, a good vacation plan, limited
Enriched
opportunity for quick advancement, and has recently
laid off some staff.
Jobs 1
Company B has an average starting salary, an
adequate health insurance plan, a reasonable number
Impoverished
of paid holidays, some opportunity for advancement,
and a stable work environment.
Vehicle A has abundant seating space, an excellent
Enriched

road-side assistance plan, free insurance coverage, a
beat-up interior, and fairly poor gas mileage.

Road Trip

Vehicle B has adequate seating space, average
interior condition, moderate cost daily insurance,
Impoverished
average gas mileage, and a limited road-side
assistance plan.
Club A has a high rate of member participation, a
variety of planned activities, requires only a small

Social Club

Enriched

time commitment, has a low level of group
cohesiveness, and participation in the different
activities can get expensive.
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Club B has average member participation, average
number of planned activities, moderate level of
Impoverished
group cohesiveness, moderate amount of time
commitment, and is affordable to join.
Apartment A has lower than average rent per month,
located in a quiet community, all new, modern
Enriched
appliances, extended driving time to work due to
traffic, and small bedrooms and closets.
Apartment
Apartment B has an average rent per month,
moderate noise level from neighbors, adequate
Impoverished
appliances, average driving time to work, and an
adequate number of parking spaces available.
Ski resort A has fantastic powder snow, a free ski
Enriched

lesson, top quality rental skis, expensive lift tickets,
and long lift lines.

Ski Trip

Ski spot B has average snow condition, average
price lift ticket, rental skis of reasonable quality,
Impoverished
average number of skiers, and moderate size ski
slopes.
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Restaurant A has very exotic atmosphere, great
Enriched

tasting food, lots of different items on the menu,
high prices, and long waits.

Restaurant
Restaurant B has moderate atmosphere, ordinary
Impoverished

food, average prices, fair service, and a variety of
items on the menu.
Car A has a 36,000-mile bumper-to-bumper
inclusive warranty, a high-performance engine, full

Enriched
option package, high insurance costs, and poorer
than average gas mileage.
Cars I
Car B has a 36,000-mile warranty on major engine
components, a standard engine, a standard option
Impoverished
package, average gas mileage, and average insurance
premiums.
Club A has a very wide selection, covers all of your
favorite titles, very quick response to the newly
Video Club

Enriched
released videos, high rental prices, and no bonus
coupons.
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Club B has moderate variety of selections, decent
rental prices, some titles of interest to you, fairly fast
Impoverished
rental of new movie releases, and some bonus
coupons from time to time.
Center A is close to your home and work, has a
highly qualified staff, large class sizes, a tiny
Enriched
playground, is expensive, and requires participation
in activities that are expensive.
Day Care
Center A is close to your home and work, has a
highly qualified staff, large class sizes, a tiny
Impoverished
playground, is expensive, and requires participation
in activities that are expensive.
Club A has many modern weight machines, is open
extended hours, provides sauna/pool privileges, is
Health Club

Enriched
expensive, the exercise classes are crowded, and
there are few trainers available for assistance.
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Impoverished

Club B has a moderate number of exercise classes, is
competitively priced, has an average number of
weight machines, is in a fairly modern building, has
an average number of trainers available to assist you,
and is open during regular business hours.
Car A has many safety features and is fully "loaded,"

Enriched

is very fuel efficient, requires high insurance
premiums, and has little trunk space.

Cars 2

Car B has an average number of safety features, is
moderately fuel efficient and equipped with standard
Impoverished
features, is of average size, and requires average
insurance premiums.
House A is in a very good neighborhood, is very
large, is close to work/schools, has high property
Enriched
taxes, a small yard, and is in need of numerous
repairs.

House

House B is in an average neighborhood, has a
Impoverished

medium-sized yard, is fairly close to your place of
work, is average in size, and has average utility bills.
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Concert A has front-row seats, has three top bands,
there is a very long wait to get into the arena, it is a
Enriched
long drive to get to the concert, and none of your
friends are going.
Concert
Concert B has average seats, the arena is a moderate
distance from your home, some of your friends are
Impoverished
attending, there is an average wait to get into the
area, and has one top band.
Doctor A is very experienced and extremely well
respected in the community, has an excellent
Enriched

"bedside manner," there is often a long wait in the
waiting room, and the office is not convenient to
your home and work.

Doctors

Doctor B has an average wait in the office, a good
reputation in the community, an average "bedside
Impoverished
manner," is a moderate distance from your home and
work, and has had seven years in practice.
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Offer A has a high salary, offers a long paid vacation
each year in addition to holidays, has a very good
Enriched
benefit package, requires some overtime work, and
has a moderately high stress level.
Jobs 2
Offer A has a high salary, offers a long paid vacation
each year in addition to holidays, has a very good
Impoverished
benefit package, requires some overtime work, and
has a moderately high stress level.
Brand A has a unique, exquisite scent, is contained
in a large bottle, comes in a box with a
Enriched
complimentary gift, is high in price, and the scent
can sometimes make people sneeze.

Colognes

Brand B has a nice scent, is contained in an average
Impoverished

size bottle, comes in a box, is moderately priced, and
you have a normal reaction to the scent.
Option A is almost always sunny, offers a lot of
cultural diversity, is nestled between the beach and

Vacations

Enriched
mountains, has several added expenses, and is prone
to high humidity
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Option B has a temperate climate, some culture
diversity, average number of attractions, variety of
Impoverished
overnight accommodations available, and is near a
beach.
Date A is honest, intelligent, seeks adventure, doesn't
Enriched
have much free time, and has a habit of being late.
Dates

Date B has a nice personality, average sense of
Impoverished

humor, is tall with brown hair, and has a college
degree.
University A has a beautiful campus, lower than
average tuition, high job placement record, is located

Enriched

more than thirty miles from any substantial cities,
has a reputation for difficult classes, and has a high
first-year failure rate.

Universities

University B has a reasonable tuition, average
number of students per educator, offers a variety of
Impoverished
degrees, and is a moderately sized campus that is
located in a suitable area.
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Pair A comes with a warrantee, they are highly
Enriched

stylish and match everything. However, they have a
high price and they wear out quick.

Shoes
Pair B holds up okay, has an average price, no
Impoverished

warrantee, they offer moderate support, and it
appears as if everyone has a pair.
Brand A is tartar control formula, with baking soda
and fluoride recommended by dentists. It comes in a

Enriched
no-mess stand-up tube, is expensive, and another
customer tells you it doesn't have much flavor.

Toothpastes

Brand B has a mint flavor, an average price, contains
Impoverished

fluoride, comes in a standard tube, and another
customer claims to use it.
Computer A has a 2-year warranty, extensive

Enriched

memory, is cheap, is rather slow in processing speed,
and comes with almost no software.

Computers
Computer A is moderately priced, has a 3-month
Impoverished

warranty, reasonable memory, is midrange in speed,
and comes with a standard package of software
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You have a 60% chance to win $80, and a 40%
Enriched
chance to lose $10.
Lottery 1
You have a 20% chance to win $50, and otherwise
Impoverished
nothing.
You have a 50% chance to win $80, and a 50%
Enriched
chance to lose $60.
Lottery 2
You have a 40% chance to win $60, otherwise
Impoverished
nothing.
You have a 40% chance to win $10, and a 60%
Enriched
chance to lose $80.
Lottery 3
You have a 20% chance to lose $50, and otherwise
Impoverished
nothing.
You have a 50% chance to win $60, and a 50%
Enriched
chance to lose $80.
Lottery 4
You have a 40% chance to lose $60, and otherwise
Impoverished
nothing

124
Appendix D

Results on Subjective Ratings
Experiment 1
For satisfaction rating, there were main effects of feature order (Ms = 7.74 vs.
7.51 for the positive-negative and negative-positive feature orders, respectively), F(1,
29) = 32.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .53, and task frame (Ms = 7.73 vs, 7.52 for selection and
rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 14.38, p = .001, ηp2 = .33, and an interaction
between the two factors, F(1, 29) = 27.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .49. For positive-negative
feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.94 for the selection task and 7.54 for the
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.51 for both
the selection and the rejection task.
For confidence rating, there were main effects of feature order (Ms = 7.75 vs.
7.60), F(1, 29) = 15.22, p = .001, ηp2 = .34, and task frame (Ms = 7.82 vs. 7.54), F(1,
29) = 34.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .54, and an interaction between the two factors, F(1, 29) =
15.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .35. For positive-negative feature order, confidence rating was
7.97 for the selection task and 7.53 for the rejection task; for negative-positive feature
order, confidence rating was 7.66 for the selection and 7.55 for the rejection task.
Experiment 2
Regarding the satisfaction rating, the main effects of task frame (Ms = 8.16 vs.
8.53 for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 42.34, p < .001, ηp2
= .59, and feature order (Ms = 8.22 vs. 8.47 for positive-negative and negative-positive
feature orders, respectively) were significant, F(1, 29) = 15.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, and
the interaction between them was also significant, F(1, 29) = 62.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .68.
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Participants in the selection task had a higher rating when the negative features were
presented above the positive features than the other way around (Ms = 8.61vs. 7.70),
whereas those in the rejection task rated their satisfaction higher when the positive
features were presented above the negative features (Ms = 8.74 vs. 8.34).
In terms of the confidence rating, the main effects of task frame (Ms = 8.24 vs.
8.52 for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 14.56, p = .001, ηp2
= .33, and feature order (Ms = 8.17 vs. 8.59 for positive-negative and negative-positive
feature orders, respectively) were significant, F(1, 29) = 34.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .54, and
the interaction between them was also significant, F(1, 29) = 46.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .62.
Participants in the selection task had a higher rating when the negative features were
presented above the positive features than the other way around (Ms = 8.76 vs. 7.71),
whereas those in the rejection task rated their confidence higher when the positive
features were presented above the negative features (Ms = 8.63 vs. 8.41).
Experiment 3A
For satisfaction rating, there significant factors were a main effect of feature
order (Ms = 8.07 vs. 7.99), F(1, 29) = 6.03, p = .020, ηp2 = .17, and an interaction
between feature order and task frame, F(1, 29) = 8.38, p = .007, ηp2 = .22. For positivenegative feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.99 for the selection task and 8.15 for
the rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 8.00 for
the selection and 7.98 for the rejection task. The main effect of task frame was not
significant, F(1, 29) = 1.45, p = .239, ηp2 = .05.
For confidence rating, the significant factors were a main effect of task frame
(Ms = 7.99 vs. 8.13), F(1, 29) = 7.27, p = .012, ηp2 = .20, and an interaction between
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task frame and feature order, F(1, 29) = 7.11, p = .012, ηp2 = .20. For positive-negative
feature order, confidence rating was 7.99 for the selection task and 8.20 for the
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, confidence rating was 8.00 for the
selection and 8.01 for the rejection task. The main effect of feature order was
approaching the .05 significance level (Ms = 8.00 vs. 7.60), F(1, 29) = 4.08, p = .053,
ηp2 = .12.
Experiment 3B
For satisfaction rating, a main effect of task frame (Ms = 7.74 vs. 7.48 for the
selection and rejection tasks, respectively) was the only significant factor, F(1, 29) =
29.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. The main effect of feature order was not significant, F(1, 29)
= 0.45, p = .507, ηp2 = .02, nor was the interaction between the two, F(1, 29) = 2.13, p
= .155, ηp2 = .07. For confidence rating, there was again only a main effect of task
frame (Ms = 7.79 vs. 7.50 for the selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) =
49.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .63. The main effect of feature order was not significant, F(1, 29)
= 0.24, p = .626, ηp2 = .01, neither was the interaction between the two, F(1, 29) = 1.59,
p = .218, ηp2 = .05.
Experiment 6
For satisfaction rating, only the interaction between feature order and task
frame was significant, F(1, 27) = 44.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .62. For positive-negative
feature order, satisfaction rating was 6.94 for the selection task and 7.26 for the
rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.12 for the
selection and 6.84 for the rejection task. The main effects of task frame, F(1, 29) =
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0.06, p = .804, ηp2 = .00, and feature order were not significant, F(1, 27) = 3.10, p
= .090, ηp2 = .10.
For confidence rating, there was an interaction between feature order and task
frame, F(1, 27) = 42.11, p < .001, ηp2 = .61. For positive-negative feature order,
satisfaction rating was 6.79 for the selection task and 7.09 for the rejection task; for
negative-positive feature order, satisfaction rating was 7.01 for the selection and 6.72
for the rejection task. The main effects of task frame, F(1, 29) = 0.00, p = .957, ηp2
= .00, and feature order were not significant, F(1, 27) = 1.37, p = .253, ηp2 = .05.
Experiment 7
For satisfaction and confidence ratings, the only effects that were approaching
significance was for the confidence rating: the main effect of task frame (Ms = 7.88 vs.
7.96 for selection and rejection tasks, respectively), F(1, 29) = 3.77, p = .062, ηp2 = .12,
and the interaction between feature order and task frame, F(1, 29) = 3.51, p = .071, ηp2
= .11. For positive-negative feature order, confidence rating was 7.84 for the selection
task and 7.99 for the rejection task; for negative-positive feature order, satisfaction
rating was 7.92 for both tasks. No other effects approached the .05 level significance,
ps > .100.
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